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PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following
entities also were defendants to the plaintiffs' action:
1.

Omni Products, Inc.;

2.

Union Pacific Railroad Company; and

3.

Utah Transit Authority.

Plaintiffs' theories of liability against these defendants varied, but included strict liability
and negligence with respect to the design and manufacture of the subject rubber panels at
the crossing, and public nuisance and negligence with respect to the installation and
maintenance of those panels. Plaintiffs settled with all of these entities before trial and
this appeal. They are not parties to this appeal.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Edward George Goebel's and Kathy Goebel's ("Goebels" or "plaintiffs") appeal
and Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.'s ("SLCSR") cross appeal are from
final orders and, with respect to the Goebels' appeal, a judgment entered by the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah which is a "court of record."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-1-2.1(3). Because Goebels' appeal and SLCSR's cross-appeal

both are timely and are from final orders and a judgment of a court of record over which
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction of this appeal. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) and § 78-2a-3; Utah R. App.
P. 3 and 4.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was there sufficient evidence upon which a jury reasonably could have

concluded that a hazardous condition existed for a long enough period of time that
SLCSR should have been aware of it and remedied it? This is the central issue raised by
Goebels' appeal. The standard of review is correction-of-error. Corbett v. Seamons, 904
P.2d 229, 232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Handy v. Union Pac. RR Co.. 841 P.2d 1210, 1215
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2.

Did the trial court err in not granting a directed verdict for SLCSR on the

basis of other reasons advanced by SLCSR? The additional reasons were preserved by
SLCSR's motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict. R. 2065-2069, 19522052, 2076-2620, 4228-4618, 6059, 6767 at Tr. 1161-1162 and 1213-1239. The
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standard of review for these additional reasons, raised by SLCSR in its cross-appeal, also
is correction-of-error. Gerbich v. Numed. Inc., 1999 UT 37,1f 10, 977 P.2d 1205, 1207;
Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc.. 1999 UT 13, % 19, 974 P.2d 288, 295; Truiillo v.
Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); Rocklev v. Fairview Care Ctrs.. Inc., 970
P.2d 277, 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
3.

Regardless of the Court's ruling on the first or second issue, did the trial

court err in ruling that SLCSR owed a statutory duty to bicyclists to maintain the crossing
surface at a crossing that was owned by UTA? SLCSR also preserved this issue in its
motions for summary judgment and for directed verdict. Because of the continuing
importance of SLCSR's legal duties with respect to UTA and the public, SLCSR asks the
Court to rule on this issue even if it otherwise affirms the judgment for SLCSR for other
reasons. The standard of review is correction-of-error. Id.; Rushton v. Salt Lake County.
1999 UT 36 H20 17, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings.

This action is to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium arising from
Mr. Goebel's bicycle accident when Mr. Goebel fell while riding westbound on 1700
South in Salt Lake City near railroad tracks at approximately 250 West. The reason why
Mr. Goebel fell is not known, and the Goebels' theories, and related evidence, are
discussed below.
On December 4, 1998, Goebels initiated this action against Omni Products, Inc.
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("Omni"), Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UP"), Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"),
SLCSR and Salt Lake City Corporation ("SLC"). They subsequently amended their
complaint before serving the defendants. R. 1-47. At that time, Goebels claims only
included negligence against all defendants and strict product liability against Omni. On
September 9, 1999, Goebels moved to amend their complaint again in order to add,
among other things, new claims against SLCSR, UP and UTA for liability under UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 56-1-11 (styled by Goebels as "Statutory Neglect to Make and Maintain

Good and Sufficient Crossing"), and against all defendants for public nuisance. Goebels
also sought to add within their existing negligence claims against SLCSR and UTA a
new basis for negligence predicated on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 3 24A
("negligent performance of undertaking"). R. 124-151. No new facts were alleged.
SLCSR opposed aspects of that motion. R. 167-184. The trial court granted the motion
to allow the new public nuisance claim predicated on defendants' alleged negligence, but
denied the other changes because the § 56-1-11 claim was superfluous and added
nothing new to Goebels already pled negligence claims against these particular
defendants, and the Restatement basis was too broad and non-specific to notify the
affected defendants of the basis for their alleged liability. R. 363-369. Goebels objected
to the proposed order (R. 370-401), and the parties ultimately stipulated to a Second
Amended Complaint that included the new public nuisance claim and also allowed the
Restatement basis to be included with more specific allegations. R. 496-541. The
Second Amended Complaint was filed May 15, 2000. R. 520-541.
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Thereafter, on April 4, 2001, Goebels and Omni settled and the trial court
dismissed Omni from this action. R. 808-813.
On May 1, 2001, approximately two and one-half years after this action was
commenced and one year after the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Goebels
filed a motion to expand the scope of their existing public nuisance claim against all
remaining defendants to have that claim impose strict liability for the alleged violation of
§ 56-1-11. R. 826-832. Again, no new facts were alleged. SLCSR opposed that motion.
R. 849-949. In response, Goebels filed a motion to once again amend their complaint to
base a strict liability public nuisance claim on § 56-1-11 and also Salt Lake City
Ordinance § 14.44.030. R. 960-992. Goebels took this tact because their existing public
nuisance claim was no different than their existing negligence claims because, as they
stated in their memorandum of points and authorities, "there is utterly no evidence to
support the idea that the creation of the alleged public nuisance by any of the defendants
was 'intentional,' 'reckless,' or cultrahazardous.'" R. 968. SLCSR opposed that motion.
R. 1010-1027. On October 9, 2001, the trial court denied both motions in what is
referred to herein as the Leave To Amend Order. (Addendum, Tab 5.) In part, the trial
court ruled that none of the statutes and the ordinance then raised by Goebels (UTAH
CODE ANN. § 10-7-26 and § 56-1-11, and Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030)
specifically prohibited the defendants' alleged conduct, there was no basis for allowing
strict liability under Goebels' public nuisance claims, Goebels did not advise the trial
court of the specific amendments they sought in a proposed third amended complaint,
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and defendants would be unfairly prejudiced if such new legal theories were added at
that stage of the proceedings.
Subsequently, Salt Lake City was dismissed from the case and UTA and UP
settled with the Goebels. SLCSR was the only defendant during trial, which commenced
on July 9, 2002. R. 5986. On the seventh day of trial, Goebels rested their case and
SLCSR moved for a directed verdict. R. 6059, 6767 at Tr. 1161-1162. SLCSR also
rested its case later that day and again moved for a directed verdict. R. 6059, 6767 at Tr.
1207, 1213-1239. The trial court took the motions under advisement, and the next day
granted a directed verdict for SLCSR on the sole ground that Goebels failed to produce
any evidence to prove notice of and an opportunity to remedy a dangerous condition.
Although it had nothing to do with the court's granting of the motion for directed verdict,
the court gratuitously ruled that SLCSR was the owner or operator of a railroad and
subject to the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-7-26, § 10-7-29 and § 56-1-11 and
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030. Goebels' Addendum at 21-35. The trial court's
order was entered on August 30, 2002, and it is referred to herein as the Directed Verdict
Order. Addendum, Tab 6. Also on August 30, 2002, the Judgment was entered for
SLCSR. Id., Tab 8. Before the Directed Verdict Order and Judgement were entered,
Goebels moved for a new trial and that motion was denied on September 24, 2002. R.
6729-6730.
Goebels now have appealed and SLCSR has cross-appealed. SLCSR does not
appeal the Directed Verdict Order and Judgment entered in its favor, but appeals two of
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the trial court's other rulings in its Directed Verdict Order (paragraphs 1 and 7), not only
because they provide alternative bases for the directed verdict and Judgment, but also
because the dicta that SLCSR is subject to statutory provisions governing those who own
or operate railways (when SLCSR does neither) is important to the continuing duties and
rights of SLCSR under common law, statutory law and contracts. SLCSR seeks a ruling
from this Court that SLCSR is not subject to enactments governing the conduct of those
who own or operate railroads even if the directed verdict is affirmed on other grounds.
B.

Statement Of Facts.

Mr. Goebel fell and was severely injured in a bicycle accident on February 19,
1998 when he was riding his bicycle westbound on 1700 South near or on the railroad
crossing located at about 250 West in Salt Lake City. A motorist traveling in the same
direction as Mr. Goebel became aware of a bicyclist passing him on his right as the
bicycle suddenly went end-over-end. R. 6762 at Tr. 136-37. Neither this witness, nor
any other witness, saw anything that appeared to cause the bicycle to go end-over-end
and Mr. Goebel has no recollection of what actually caused his accident.
The tracks at this crossing were known as the Provo Subdivision Line and had
been owned for many years by the UP. On October 30, 1992, more than five years
before this accident, UP sold these tracks to UTA. At that time, UTA intended to build
and operate light rail passenger ("TRAX") service on this right of way but had no
intention to provide freight service to the existing freight customers located along these
tracks. SLCSR was formed to continue freight service to these customers. Thus, when
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UP sold the tracks to UTA, UP retained a limited easement which allowed it to continue
freight service on UTA's right of way. This easement was immediately transferred to
SLCSR.
SLCSR and UTA also entered into a coordination agreement which further set
forth the SLCSR's limited use of UTA's railroad and demonstrated UTA's control over
its railroad. Goebels' Addendum at 43-70. Among other things, UTA, at its sole
discretion, determined which portions of its railroad would be designated as "Passenger
Trackage" and which portions would be "Freight Trackage" or "Joint Trackage."
SLCSR's freight trains were forbidden by the agreement from traveling on whatever
UTA designated to be Passenger Trackage. Id. at 55, ^ 5.1. The coordination agreement
further restricted the freight service easement in that UTA determined what times of day
SLCSR could operate on UTA's railroad. Id. at 55-56, % 5.4. The coordination
agreement required SLCSR only to maintain crossings on Freight Trackage to the extent
necessary for its freight service:
"[SLCSR] shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not conduct
directly or indirectly,... any other activity whatsoever on the Right-of-Way
that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service." Id. at 48-49, ^ 2.1 (emphasis
added).
"Freight Rail Service" is defined in the agreement as "the common carrier rail freight
operations to be conducted by [SLCSR] on the Right-of-Way." Id. at 45. All other
activity expressly was prohibited. Id- at 48-49, U 2.1, (emphasis added).
SLCSR did not agree to maintain the crossing surface, on behalf of the owner,
UTA, and did not assume any duty of the property owner to provide a reasonably safe
-7-

surface for bicyclists or other travelers over UTA's crossings. In fact, pursuant to the
coordination agreement, SLCSR was barred from doing anything other than what was
necessary for freight service. Contrary to the statement Goebels made in their brief, at
page 9, SLCSR never was "in possession" of the crossing. It merely had a right to
operate over portions of it for a limited purpose and at times dictated by UTA.
At the time of the accident, UTA was in the process of refurbishing its railroad
line, including the replacement of crossings with cement panels instead of wooden
planks or rubber pads. The subject crossing was removed and replaced in August of
1998, by UTA, some six months after the accident.
To construct a grade crossing, one must place some material between the rails and
on the roadway leading up to the rails that will make the road surface almost even with
the top of the rails. The surface of this material must be slightly lower than the surface of
the rails and it must be constructed with a narrow trough on the inside of each rail to
accommodate the flange that exists on all locomotive and railcar wheels. Otherwise,
trains would derail at crossings. The necessity of a flange groove and the slight
differences between the surface of the rail and the surface of the roadway makes it
impossible for grade crossings to be made as smooth as the roadway leading up to them.
Many materials can be used to construct crossings. Many crossings are simply
made of dirt or asphalt. For many years, however, wooden planks were the primary
material used for crossings on more traveled roadways. Crossings built with concrete
panels or large rubber pads have become more common in recent years.
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The rubber pads which were in place at 1700 South and 250 West at the time of
the subject accident replaced the old wooden planking, and were required by SLC years
before the accident, when UP, who then owned the crossing, was upgrading it. The pads
between the rails (the "gauge panels") are nominally 29 Vi" X 72" and two pads placed
side by side are required to fill the space between the rails. Pads outside the rails (the
"field panels") are nominally 22 lA" X 72" and one pad is placed outside each rail for
each six linear feet (72 inches) of track. Thus, at the time and place of the accident there
were a total of four pads for each six linear feet of track. At 1700 South, there were a
total of forty pads for each set of rails that crossed that street. There were two sets of
rails, and the accident occurred near the western set. The pads were abutted to each other
and screwed into the railroad ties.
Given the width of a street such as 1700 South, there has to be seams where the
rubber pads, cement panels or wooden planks abut each other. It is not feasible to
manufacture and install a single pad, panel, or plank that would extend the entire width
of such a roadway. Therefore, most crossings have seams which generally run in the
direction of the oncoming highway traffic. Over time, these seams widen from the
effects of traffic, debris, and the icing and thawing of the debris that works its way into
the seam. Thus, what Goebels characterize as "gaps," are seams that may widen over
time. Usually these gaps fill with dirt and other small particle roadway debris. A "gap"
of an inch or less may not be perceived as a "gap" if it is filled with dirt or other debris.
Of the forty panels at the 1700 South crossing, only eight were ever relevant to
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plaintiffs' claims. These panels were numbered one through eight for consistent
reference to them during trial and the seams between the numbered panels were
designated by reference to the abutting numbered panels. See the diagram of the
crossing, Pltfs.' Ex. 54, and the photograph, Deft's Ex. 4 included in the Addendum at
Tabs 8 and 9. Of the eight panels, the one most south and east was numbered " 1 . " The
next three pads to the west on the south side were pads "2,", " 3 " and "4." Pad "5" was
the most north and west of the eight pads and pad "8" was the pad most to the north and
east.
Laying in the hospital, Mr. Goebel had no idea as to what caused his accident.
Therefore, Mrs. Goebel went to the scene two or three days after the accident. Once
there, she formulated a theory that on the date of the accident one particular space
between two of the gauge panels was of such a precise width and depth that it barely
accommodated the front tire of the bicycle.
This was the gap between panels that were and are referred to as pads number two
and seven. See Addendum, Tab 8 and 9. She also noted the next seam to the west but
still between the rails. This "gap"is between pads number three and six. She determined
this gap to be progressively more narrow until it could not have accommodated her
husband's bicycle tire. She surmised that the bicycle tire traveled into the two-seven gap
and then was pinched or wedged in the three-six gap so as to stop the rotation of the front
wheel of the bicycle. She, and others after her, took pictures of this particular gap. One
such photograph is included in the Addendum at Tab 10. This particular gap was the
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focus of the Goebels' initial complaint and each amended complaint. R. 3, 27, 522.
Some two and one-half years after the accident and two years after the crossing
had been taken out of the ground, Goebels1 accident reconstruction expert observed dents
in the rims of Mr. Goebel's bicycle wheels which he believed evidenced that the wheels
had struck a hard object with a dramatic amount of force at the time of the accident. This
conclusion was confirmed by Goebels' bicycle expert, Mr. Collins. See R. 6763 at Tr.
373, 376-77. There was no hard object which could have caused these dents in the twoseven and three-six gaps located between the rails which had been the focus of the
litigation up to that point in time. Goebels1 accident reconstructionist concluded the
pinch theory not to be viable and, in his opinion, a different gap was now the most likely
cause of the accident. R. 6766 at Tr. 864-66. This previously unnoteworthy gap was to
the east of the east rail between two field panels. It is the "gap" between pads number
one and eight. See Addendum, Tabs 8 and 9. Goebels1 expert believed Mr. Goebel's
front and rear tires and wheels "fell" into this particular gap and were channeled by the
gap into the east rail which in his opinion produced the dents in the wheel rims and
caused the accident.
SLCSR's accident reconstruction expert, Mr. Woolley, concluded none of the gaps
could have caused the accident. The dents in the front rim of Mr. Goebel's bicycle could
not have resulted from being "channeled" by the subject one-eight gap into the eastern
rail. The only precise measurements taken of the gap between panels one and eight while
the crossing was still in place demonstrated that it was not wide enough to accommodate
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Mr. Goebel's rim let alone the tires. See Addendum, Tab 11; R. 6767 at Tr. 1177-84,
1199-2000, 1205; R. 6766 at Tr. 1026-27; and R. 6765 at Tr. 778, 805-06. Moreover,
Mr. Woolley conducted experiments from which he concluded that the dents in the rims
of Mr. Goebel's bicycle could only be produced if a man of Mr. Goebel's weight traveled
at least twenty miles an hour into an abrupt height differential of over three inches. R.
6766 at Tr. 992-1010, 1012-22. The tremendous amount offeree required to produce
these dents was confirmed by Goebels' bicycle expert, Mr. Collins. See R. 6763 at Tr.
373, 376-77. Even if Mr. Goebel's tires could have gone into the one-eight "gap," the
height differential was not great enough because the gap was not long enough. Even if
the one-eight "gap" were not filled with debris as it appears in Dfts. Ex. 1 (Addendum,
Tab 11), the wheel of the bicycle, traveling twenty miles per hour, would traverse the
entire twenty-one inch length of the seam before it could fall three inches. R. 6766 at Tr.
1021-22, 1035-36. See also R. 6766 at Tr. 1036-37. In Mr. Woolley's opinion, the dent
in the front rim was most likely caused by Mr. Goebel angling completely off of the
crossing and striking the rail where the ties were exposed.1
A directed verdict was granted by the trial court solely because after the close of
all the evidence the trial court concluded that the Goebels had not submitted any
evidence to prove that a gap even existed prior to the time of the accident in a condition
1

This conclusion was consistent with SLCSR's theory of the accident. Mr. Goebel was
traveling faster on his new bicycle (see R. 6765 at Tr.664, 700) and there was bumper to
bumper traffic to his left. R. 6762 at Tr. 134, 137, 143, 146, 1438. When he went to
make his usual move to his left to avoid a protuberance in the roadway, he could not do
so because of bumper to bumper vehicular traffic on his left. He thus had to go over the
protuberance at too high of a speed or go to the right of it where the crossing ended.
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that a reasonable man would think hazardous, let alone that it existed in such a condition
for sufficient time for SLCSR to notice such a gap, perceive its danger and correct it.
Goebels did not produce a single witness who claimed to have noticed any gap
before the accident, let alone one who reported it or even thought it might be hazardous.
To the contrary, every witness who had any reason to look for potential hazards at this
crossing, including Mr. Goebel and other bicyclists, never saw any noteworthy gap.
Moreover, even after the accident had occurred, the EMT who attended Mr. Goebel at
the scene, Mrs. Goebel, her attorney, an investigator hired by her attorney, and the
General Manager of SLCSR failed to note anything unusual or potentially hazardous
about the one-eight gap claimed during the trial to be the gap which caused the accident.
The following is a summary of the relevant testimony in this regard.
John Martinez was the track inspector for SLCSR at the time of Mr. GoebeFs
accident. He had worked from 1944 to 1974 for the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad and
from 1974 to 1994 as a Federal Railroad Administration track inspector. R. 6067-68 at
depo. pages 12-13. In addition to working as a federal track inspector for twenty years,
he had been a track foreman, a track supervisor, a track assistant roadmaster and a
roadmaster. Id. at 24. During his work as a track inspector for SLCSR, he fixed or
directed others to fix anything he saw wrong with any crossing. Id. at 32. If he saw a
rubber pad was loose, he would fix it. Id. at 32-35. He testified, " I was responsible for
anything along that railroad track. That's why I fixed the crossings in Sandy and Draper
. ..." Id- at 33, see also pages 36, 51 and 63-64. But " . . . I did not see anything on this
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[the 1700 South] crossing." Id. at 33-34, 37-38. "To me it was not dangerous." Id. at
47. In his fifty years of railroad work he had never heard of a bicyclist being hurt by
getting his tires stuck in a seam between crossing pads. Id- at 58-59.
Denny Parry was a Railroad Safety Inspector for the Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") R. 6767 at Tr. 1163. He had held that position for over ten
years. Id. Prior to taking the job with UDOT, he had worked as track laborer, a track
foreman, a track inspector and a track supervisor for the Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad. Id. at 1163. He had worked on and around railroad tracks since 1974. Id- In
February of 1998, the month when Mr. Goebel's accident occurred, he inspected the
track in question, including the crossing at 1700 South. Id. at 1164. He testified that
when he inspected crossings as a State Inspector, he wanted to make sure there was
nothing that would pose an unusual hazard to citizens of the State of Utah. Id. at 1166.
He did not observe any gaps between the crossing pads that he thought posed any hazard
to bicyclists. Id. at 1167. He also had never heard of a claim of a bicyclist being injured
because his wheel went into a gap between crossing pads until Mr. Goebel's lawsuit. Id.
at 1167.
The Goebels called Mr. Felix Alires. At the time of the accident, he was the
South District Manager and Accident Investigator for the Salt Lake City Street
Department. R. 6763 at p. 287. He had held this position for ten years and 1700 South,
where it crosses the subject tracks, was in his district. Id and 291. He testified that he is
always on the lookout for possible hazards and he had no recollection of ever noting
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anything wrong with the subject crossing (id. at 291) and no recollection of anyone
calling in to even suggest any kind of hazard to bicyclists because of any gaps at that
crossing. Id. 291-2. He also had never heard of a bicyclist being injured because his tire
went into a gap at a railroad crossing. Id- at 293.
Mr. Joseph Aquilar became the South District Manager for the Salt Lake City
Street Department after Mr. Alires retired. R. 6763 at 296. He had worked for the Street
Department steadily since 1979. Id. at 297. He went out to the crossing during its
conversion to TRAX, long after the accident and after the rubber pads had been
removed. The rubber pads had been replaced with concrete panels and, when he was
there, the rubber-like grout filler had not be placed in the concrete seams. He thought
those concrete seams presented a potential hazard. R. 6763 at 303. However, he had
never noticed anything he thought hazardous about this crossing before the rubber pads
were replaced with concrete as part of the TRAX construction. Id. at 308-9. He also had
never heard of anyone calling in and complaining that this crossing was unsafe for
bicyclists. Id. at 309. He too had never heard of a bicyclist being injured because his tire
went into a gap in a railroad crossing. Id- at 310.
Mr. Crosby Mecham was the manager of Facilities Design and Construction for
the UTA. R. 6764 at p. 570. He was the "point man" for UTA with respect to the
TRAX line that was being constructed. Id. at 577, R. 6765 at Tr. 601. Mr. Mecham
testified that at the time of Mr. Goebel's accident, UTA owned the tracks that crossed
1700 South at 250 West subject to SLCSR's easement to use them for freight service. R.
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6765 at 605. He was involved in UTA's acquisition of this track and literally walked its
entire length. Id. 607. He was asked if he could remember seeing any gaps between the
rubber pads at any of the crossings that he thought might cause a problem for bicyclists
and he answered, "No." Id. at 607. As UTA's point man for these tracks, he received
complaints from citizens from time to time concerning UTA crossings but never did
anyone "in any walk of life" call him and say that they thought there might be some
problem for bicyclists because of gaps between the rubber pads at any of these crossings.
Id- at 608. Until he learned of Mr. GoebePs accident, gaps at crossings as a problem for
bicyclists had never crossed his mind. Id. at 608. He requested a subordinate, Jason
Mumford, to survey all of the crossings on the UTA line. Id. Mr. Mumford's task was
to inspect and report back to Mr. Mecham the condition of each of the crossings. Id. at
609. Mr. Mumford's report was admitted into evidence as Ex. D-14. This exhibit
showed that Mr. Mumford examined the crossing at 1700 South and 250 West, and even
counted the number of rubber pads at this crossing. His assessment was that this
crossing was in "good condition." Id. at 611. Mr. Mumford did not report any potential
hazard to bicyclists and Mr. Mecham was aware of no one ever suggesting that there was
anything wrong with this crossing that might affect the safety of bicyclists. Id. at 611-13.
The paramedic who attended to Mr. Goebel, Jeffrey Clark, testified that as he
approached Mr. Goebel he thought the tracks may have had something to do with the
accident, but, even thinking this, he did not notice any gaps between the crossing pads.
R. 6763 at 227, 236-7, 244. This despite the fact that he walked across the crossing
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surface to get to Mr. Goebel. Id. at 239.
SLCSR called David Miller as an expert in crossing maintenance. Mr. Miller was
the Manager of Track Projects for the UP. He was responsible for track maintenance and
safety for a five state area including Utah (R. 6762 at Tr. 96) and he had worked in the
railroad industry since 1978. Id. His present duties included training and supervising UP
personnel who inspect track and railroad crossings. Id. He expects the inspectors who
work under him to look for anything at a crossing that would endanger anyone, including
bicyclists (id- at 108-9) and if he saw something he thought posed an unreasonable
danger to bicyclists on a UP track he would get it repaired immediately. Id. at 109.
However, in over 20 years of railroad experience he had never heard of a bicyclist being
injured because of a wheel getting into a gap in a crossing (id- 109 and 125) even though
all crossings, whether rubber, wood or cement develop gaps in the seams over time. Id.
104-5. Even though this crossing was previously owned by UP and was now in his
territory (although no longer owned by UP) he had never heard of any complaint about
gaps in the subject crossing before this lawsuit was filed. Id. at 109. He was shown
several photographs of the subject crossing taken after the accident (Exhibits P-8, P-9, P10, P-l 1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, P-8), including the photograph which shows Mrs.
Goebel's finger in the gap between pads two and seven (Ex. P-l 1, included in
Addendum, Tab 10). He was then asked whether he thought those photographs showed
"anything wrong with that crossing." He answered, "No, I don't." Id. at 114 and 128-9.
Then he was shown the only photograph anyone had taken before the crossing was
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removed of the one-eight gap claimed at trial to be the cause of the accident. (Exhibit D1 included in Addendum, Tab 11.) He was then asked if he would take any exception to
that gap and do anything to fix it. He answered, "No, I wouldn't." Id. at 115.
Mr. Jay Jackson was the General Manager for SLCSR at the time of Mr. Goebel's
accident. After he heard that Mr. Goebel claimed to have been injured at the 1700 South
crossing because of a gap between the pads, he went to the crossing to inspect it. R.
6765 at Tr. 623. Mr. Jackson couldn't find any gaps which could have posed a problem
to bicyclists at this crossing. Id. at 623. On prior occasions, problems at other crossings
had been reported and corrected. Id. at 629-30. Nobody, not SLCSR's regular track
inspector, not any engineer or conductor, not anybody from UTA or SLC, nor any private
citizen ever reported to him any problem for bicyclists due to gaps between the pads at
any of SLCSR's crossings. Id. at 630, 636. He personally inspected the 1700 South
crossing and noted no unusual hazard for bicyclists. Id. 631.
A retired police officer, Jeff Ertel, hired by Goebels' counsel to investigate this
accident, saw nothing remarkable about the one-eight gap. He went to the scene three
different times in the month following the accident, once with Goebels' counsel R. 6762
at Tr. 172-3. Despite knowing that this accident occurred and knowing that Goebels'
counsel thought a gap between crossing pads caused the accident (id. at 173 and R. 6763
at Tr. 190), Mr. Ertel didn't even bother to photograph the gap between pads one and
eight. Id. at 201, 205. Goebels' counsel pointed Mr. Ertel to the wrong gap (the twoseven gap) and that was the one he photographed. Id. at 174. Counsel and Mr. Ertel
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focused upon gaps between pads two and seven and pads three and six. These were the
gaps ruled out by Goebels' accident reconstruction expert, Mr. Ingebretsen, as being gaps
which could have caused this accident. The gap between pads one and eight (shown in
Exhibit D-l, Addendum, Tab 11) was the gap claimed at trial by Mr. Ingebretsen to be
the cause of the accident. Mr. Ertel couldn't even remember discussing this gap while at
the scene with Goebels' counsel. Id at 191. Mr. Ertel also recalls no discussion of a
protuberance in the road. Id. at 193-4, 200, 207. Mr. Ertel prepared a report and a
diagram to memorialize his investigation and in neither did he mention the subject (oneeight) gap. Id. at 202-3 ?
The Goebels called Charles Collins who was a self described bicycle enthusiast.
This young man had been riding bicycles in Utah for fourteen years, logging between
2500 and 8000 miles per year. R. 6763 at p. 333. He raced bicycles and organized
bicycle races. In the two years before Mr. Goebel's accident, the common route he, and
what he called the "bicycle racing community," (id. at 361) traveled was 1700 South to
get to a training center west of the Salt Lake City Airport. Id. at 335-6. He either
individually, or with a group of up to 30 other racers, traveled over the subject crossing

2

On one of Mr. Ertel's visits he made a video tape of the approach to the crossing from
Mr. Goebel's perspective. The Goebels have taken a "freeze frame" from that tape and
had it computer enhanced. This computer created image was admitted as Ex. P-10 and is
included in the Goebels' addendum. Simple comparison of P-10 to the actual video tape
demonstrates that the image has been enlarged and the definition enhanced which makes
the edges of the gaps sharper and the contrast of shadow and light greater than the real
image on the tape. This enhancement of a segment of video tape which unintentionally
included the one-eight gap contrasts dramatically with that gap's appearance in Exhibit
D-l, the only actual photograph of this gap.
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approximately 100 times in the two years before Mr. Goebel's accident. Id. at 361. He
was asked if he recalled ever noticing any gaps in the crossing surface at 1700 South and
250 West and he answered, "No." Id- at 338. Mr. Collins noted that bicycle riders take
due care when they approach railroad crossings. Id- at 360, 362. He acknowledged that
he and those he was riding with looked for hazards and paid attention every time they
crossed the railroad crossing at 1700 South and 250 West. He could not recall ever
seeing any gaps at that crossing he thought to be a hazard to bicyclists. Id. 362-3. In
fact, he could recall nothing at that crossing that he thought posed a hazard to bicyclists.
Id. at 362. Moreover, no other bicyclists "in the bicycle racing community" ever stated
in his presence that he or she perceived a potential hazard from any gaps in the crossing
at 1700 South. Id. at 364. He also had never heard of a bicyclist being injured because
his or her tire went into a seam between crossing pads. Id. at 361.
Finally, Mr. Goebel was an experienced bicyclist. R. 6765 at Tr. 644-50. From
April of 1997 until his accident the following February, he regularly commuted on his
bicycle to his workplace at 1050 South 700 West from his home in Murray. Id. at 65061, 655-56. His regular route to and from work took him over the crossing at 1700
South and 250 West. Id. at 656-59. He was aware of this crossing and had traveled over
it a hundred times or more. Id. at 658, 695-96. He could not recall ever noticing any
gaps at the railroad crossing. Id. at 659, 707-08. He did not recall seeing any gaps at the
time of his accident or recall feeling the wheel of his bicycle go into any gap. Id- at 716.
He had no idea as to how this accident happened until his wife suggested her gap theory
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several days later. Id- at 716-17. Until then, the possibility that his front wheel went into
a gap between the pads never crossed his mind. Id. at 718. When Mrs. Goebel told Mr.
Goebel she thought a gap in the pads was a cause of his accident, she was talking about
the gap between pads two and seven and three and six, not the one-eight gap claimed at
trial to be the cause. Id. at 735. Mr. Goebel doesn't believe his wife even mentioned that
gap and he believed it was more than a year after the suit was filed (actually two years)
before anyone suggested to him that the one-eight gap might have had anything to do
with his accident. Id. at 735-37.
In summary, the railroad inspector responsible for this crossing did not perceive a
hazard posed by any gap in the seams. Neither did the State of Utah track inspector. The
UTA point man for the TRAX project walked this crossing and saw no hazard posed by
any gaps. The person he sent to survey it noted no problem. SLC Street Department
supervisors responsible for 1700 South observed no "gaps." No citizens complained to
SLCSR, SLC, the UTA, or anyone else about any gaps in this crossing. Bicyclists, who
probably are in the best position to look for and perceive potential bicycle hazards,
regularly traveled over this crossing and they saw no dangerous gaps. Mr. Goebel recalls
seeing no potentially hazardous gaps during the 100 times or more he went over this
crossing each workday before the day of his accident.
After people knew the accident occurred they either saw no noteworthy gaps (Mr.
Clark and Mr. Jackson) or they completely ignored what Goebels claimed at trial to be
the obviously hazardous gap that caused Mr. Goebel's accident (Mrs. Goebel, her
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attorney and Mr. Ertel). It was this total lack of any notice of a potential hazard or even
proof that a hazard existed that persuaded the trial court to grant a directed verdict.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Point I below, SLCSR argues that the directed verdict should be affirmed for
the reason stated by the trial court. All of Goebels' claims against SLCSR required them
to prove negligence including, in this case, SLCSR's actual or constructive knowledge of
a dangerous condition before the accident and in time to have corrected it. The trial court
correctly held that Goebels presented no such evidence as to notice and opportunity to
remedy. Goebels' novel attempts to circumvent the need for such evidence also fail.
In Point II, SLCSR addresses additional reasons to affirm the directed verdict.
Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN.§ 10-7-26, § 10-7-29, § 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City
Ordinance § 14.44.030, full and complete copies of which are included in the Addendum
at Tabs 1-4, do not apply to SLCSR who does not own or operate UTA's "railroad."
SLCSR asks that the Court rule on this issue even if it otherwise affirms the Judgment
for SLCSR. As additional reasons to affirm the Judgment for SLCSR, this Court should
hold that small gaps, like the gap alleged to have existed by Goebels, do not render a
crossing unreasonably dangerous. Also, there was no evidence to prove that SLCSR
could have foreseen such a small gap would be unreasonably dangerous to travelers who
exercise ordinary care for their safety, or that the alleged gap actually caused Mr.
Goebel's accident.
In Point III, SLCSR addresses two other issues raised by Goebels, that do not
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require reversal, on which Goebels desire rulings should this case be retried. One issue is
an evidentiary ruling which has not been shown to have been an abuse of the trial court's
discretion. The other is the trial court's ruling that SLCSR owed no duty to the Goebels
under SLCSR's agreement with UTA, pertaining to SLCSR's use of UTA's railroad for
freight purposes, or under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 A, pertaining to voluntary
undertakings. The agreement imposed no duty onto SLCSR and SLCSR never
undertook any duty to remove small gaps from UTA's crossing surfaces. The trial
court's rulings on these issues were correct.3
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANTING OF A DIRECTED VERDICT
WAS PROPER ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL.
A.

Actual Or Constructive Notice Of A Hazard And An Opportunity To
Cure Must Be Proven In Order For There To Be A Legal Duty To
Address An Existing Hazard.

The Goebels' claims against SLCSR included negligence, public nuisance, and
loss of consortium. All of these claims require proof of all the essential elements of
negligence including, in this case, actual or constructive notice of the hazard.
Goebels claim they can ignore this element under their public nuisance claim. An
3

An additional point needs to be made in response to Goebels5 brief. Goebels emphasize
factual contentions that are unsupported by evidence and that are irrelevant. Goebels
discuss the purported sentiments of the jurors, following the trial court's decision to grant
the directed verdict, and they discuss Mr. Goebel's alleged medical condition after trial.
Doing so is inappropriate. Contrary to Goebels' pitch that the trial court's ruling wasted
Goebels' and the jurors' time, it is the Goebels who have caused SLCSR, the trial court
and the jurors to incur unnecessary time and expenses by pursuing claims that are
unsupportable under and contrary to the law. If the trial court contributed to the waste of
resources it only was by not granting summary judgment before trial.
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essential element of a public nuisance is "unreasonable" conduct, and "[c]onduct creating
a nuisance which harms the plaintiff is unreasonable only where it is intentional,
negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous." Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah
App. 1994), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). Goebels admitted that "there is
utterly no evidence to support the idea that the creation of the alleged public nuisance by
any of the defendants was 'intentional,' 'reckless,' or 'ultrahazardous.'" R. 968. Thus,
Goebels had to prove that SLCSR was negligent to satisfy the "unreasonable" conduct
element of their public nuisance claim.
In their Point VI.A.6., Goebels contend that "negligence" in the context of a
public nuisance claim means something different than what it otherwise means in all
other contexts because otherwise, Goebels reason, a public nuisance claim would be
superfluous of a negligence claim. Thus, Goebels suggest, the inquiry under a public
nuisance claim in this case is merely to find a "lack of concern." The problem with that
position is it can't be shown that a defendant lacks concern unless that defendant has
notice of the existing danger and then fails to have concern for it. The law can't go so
far as to hold a defendant liable for merely not caring, in the abstract, about some
possible hazard of which it has no actual or constructive knowledge. This Court should
not follow Goebels' suggestion to have private liability under public nuisance law, when
based on alleged negligent conduct, require less than a showing of negligence. Indeed
the Erickson court was correct in upholding the body of law pertaining to negligence
when holding that if a private claim for public nuisance is predicated on negligent
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conduct, the inability to prove negligence is fatal to the public nuisance claim. 877 P.2d
at 150.
Mrs. Goebel's loss of consortium claim also requires proof of negligence. Under
Utah law, loss of consortium is a derivative cause of action. A wife who allegedly lost
marital services cannot recover if her husband does not have a viable cause of action.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 30-2-11(5). Accordingly, Mrs. Goebel's claim for loss of

consortium depends on the viability of Mr. Goebel's negligence based claims.
In this instance, Goebels had to prove notice and failure to remedy in order to
prove negligence. "When a plaintiffs claim is based on the [defendant's] failure to
repair rather than on affirmative negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of showing the
[defendant] knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, a dangerous
condition existed and the [defendant] had sufficient time to take corrective action."
Klienert v. Kimball Elevator Co.. 854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Whether a
defendant had notice and an opportunity to repair is "the essential inquiry relating to
defendant's negligence." Martin v. Safeway Stores. Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah
1977). See also Merino v. Albertsons. Inc.. 1999 UT 14, % 4-5, 975 P.2d 467,468-69;
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light. 969 P.2d 403,407 (Utah 1998); Schnuphase v.
Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476,478 (Utah 1996); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms.
Inc.. 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store. 531 P.2d 360, 362
(Utah 1973); Howard v. Auerbach Co.. 437 P.2d 895, 896 (Utah 1968); Malonev v. Salt
Lake City. 262 P.2d 281. 282 (Utah 1953).
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In the context of the duty to keep streets in repair, this Court has stated:
To breach the duty . . . to make the street safe for travel, a [defendant] must
have notice [of the alleged defect] and then must fail to respond within a
reasonable time to repair the [defect]. As we stated in Schnuphase v. Storehouse
Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996):
"'[F]ault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the
condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge
because the condition had existed long enough that he should have
discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed
that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it.'"
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light. 969 P.2d 403, 407 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted)
(quoting Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) (quoting
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)). In Fishbaugh. the
plaintiff, who was struck by a car in a crosswalk, alleged that SLC and Utah Power &
Light were negligent for failing to maintain streetlights. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City and UP&L because
even assuming . . . that UP&L had notice of the outage at some time prior to the
accident, there is no evidence indicating how long UP&L had such notice.
Without any evidence to that effect, [plaintiff] cannot prove that the City and
UP&L failed to repair the streetlights within a reasonable time after receiving
notice and that they were thus negligent in maintaining the streetlights.
Id at 408.
In Malonev v. Salt Lake City. 262 P.2d 281 (Utah 1953), the sidewalk plaintiff
had regularly walked on collapsed, and he sued SLC for negligent maintenance. In
affirming a directed verdict for the City, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to
show that the sidewalk's poor condition had existed for a sufficient amount of time to
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give the City notice of it and repair it, particularly where the plaintiff himself had used
the sidewalk before the accident and noticed no defects: "In this respect we think
[plaintiffs] evidence fails to support a finding in his favor. [Plaintiff], himself could not
state that the sidewalk was in a defective condition before the accident, although he had
previously used the sidewalk in question many times." IdL at 282 (emphasis added).
The same rule has been applied in cases in which plaintiffs allege defects on
railroad crossing surfaces. See, Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. v.
Wright, 549 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Ky. 1976)(no proof that the railroad company had notice
of the condition, or that the condition could have been discovered in the exercise of
reasonable care); Bentz v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 184 So. 448, 448 (Miss. 1938)
(affirming directed verdict for defendant railroad charged with failing to correct a 2V2" to
3" tripping hazard at railroad crossing where "the traveling public, among whom was the
plaintiff, had passed over the road frequently, and no one had noticed the presence of this
projecting rock"); Liddle v. Thompson, 162 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942)
(reversing verdict for plaintiff, injured due to uneven and protruding railroad crossing
planks, because there was no proof "that the defendant either had actual or constructive
notice of the defect within time to make repairs before the time of an accident alleged to
have been occasioned thereby").
B.

No Evidence Was Presented During Trial Of Actual or
Constructive Notice To SLCSR Of Any Potential Danger From
The Subject Gap.

Goebels presented no evidence that the alleged gap was hazardous before the
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accident or that SLCSR had notice of and an opportunity to remedy its condition. To the
contrary, none of the many individuals who inspected the crossing shortly before Mr.
GoebePs accident noticed any gap, and those who inspected the crossing after the
accident never thought the one-eight gap would pose any hazard. Critically, like the
plaintiff in Maloney v. Salt Lake City, Mr. Goebel himself could not state that the
crossing was defective before his accident, and he had ridden his bicycle over it almost
daily for nearly a year before the accident, including the day before the accident. In
addition, Goebels could not prove what the supposedly hazardous gap looked like before
the accident - not only how wide it was but whether or not it was filled with debris. What
should SLCSR have seen when it regularly inspected this crossing.? It is telling that
nowhere in their brief do Goebels try to marshal evidence of record to support this
element of their claims. All evidence was contrary to any finding that SLCSR knew or
should have known a hazard existed in time to repair it.
To counter all the evidence against them, Goebels merely argue in their Point
VI.A.4. that SLCSR's knowledge of the allegedly hazardous gap can be presumed,
contrary to the evidence, because the gap was "permanent." When large rubber pads are
placed together to form a crossing there always will be seams. However, when does a
seam become wide or deep enough to be called a "gap?" Also, not every gap can
accommodate a bicycle tire, and in fact very few can according to Goebels5 own
argument that generally gaps do not get bigger than 3/4". Goebels' brief at 25.
The essence of Goebels argument is that once a gap of any size is seen, or is
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discoverable, although not yet dangerous, it should be removed so it never has a chance
to become dangerous. However, Goebels are wrong in implying that all gaps are in a
permanent dangerous condition or will become dangerous. There was no evidence that
SLCSR was on notice of any gap or that the gap, assuming one existed, was going to
become dangerous before UTA refurbished that crossing for its TRAX line or before the
accident. Goebels' argument should be rejected because it would require the removal of
all gaps, even razor thin gaps, simply because they may become dangerous. Goebels'
sole authority, a 1895 Pennsylvania case, does not support that position. In that case,
there was evidence of the existing hazard in the worn rail and that the hazard "was
apparent and the danger probable" before the accident. Gitton v. Heston, Montana &
Fairmount Passenger Ry., 31 A. 249, 250 (Pa. 1895). That court stated that knowledge
that a hazard may exist from wear and tear creates a duty to inspect, not a duty to replace
before the hazard exists. Id. There is no evidence that the subject gap had reached the
critical point of being recognized as wide and deep enough to be dangerous, or that it
was known that it ever would reach that point, before the time of the accident or the
replacement of the entire crossing by UTA. Thus, Goebels' attempt to circumvent the
need for evidence of notice and opportunity to correct should be rejected.
Similarly, Goebels also contend in their Point VI.A.5. that it does not matter that
no one noticed the alleged gap because the jury can infer from the fact that some seam
exists that a gap existed for a long time and that SLCSR should have noticed it as
presenting a hazard before the accident. However, there was no evidence of any gap
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prior to the accident, no record and no public complaint of a gap, and no witness saw a
gap, including Goebels' bicycle expert, Charles Collins, and Mr. Goebel himself, both of
whom had been riding bicycles over that crossing numerous times immediately before
Mr. Goebel's accident. It cannot reasonably be inferred both that a gap existed and that it
had become wide and deep enough to present a hazard simply because some kind of
seam always must exist between the panels or pads. Indeed a seam or gap cannot be a
hazard to bicyclists if bicycle tires can't fit into it. In arguing that Mr. Goebel's and his
bicycle expert's failure to see any hazard is not important, Goebels ignore that Mr.
Goebel and his bicycle expert clearly had a duty to travel at appropriate speeds to observe
and avoid potential roadway hazards. No one is better able to appreciate a potential
hazard to bicyclists than bicyclists. The fact that they admit to not seeing any hazard
before Mr. Goebel's accident is extremely significant. Goebels merely assume contrary
to the evidence, that there was a gap and that it was obviously dangerous for long period
of time.
Also, the undisputed evidence was that gaps can form quickly, as well as over
time. The photographs of the eight pads in question show they have been violently
struck at some time by snow plows or something else. See the scrape marks which
appear on the pads in Exhibit D-4 and Exhibit P-l 1, Addendum, Tabs 9 and 10. Also,
there was evidence that gaps that form over time generally become filled with debris.
There was no evidence as to whether a street sweeper or a storm could or did clean out
any debris in the one-eight gap. Consequently, not only is there no evidence upon which
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a jury reasonably could conclude the subject gap was wide enough and deep enough to
be dangerous for a sufficient period of time to have ben recognized as dangerous and
corrected, but any reasonable inference from the actual evidence is to the contrary.
Goebels, therefore, could not and did not prove that SLCSR had actual or constructive
notice of the alleged dangerous gap.
C.

A "Protuberance" In The Asphalt Does Not Negate The Need To
Prove Notice Of The Allegedly Existing Hazardous Gap.

In an attempt to circumvent their inability to prove prior notice of the allegedly
hazardous gap, Goebels argue in their Point VI.A.2. that SLCSR should have known of
what they call a "protuberance" in the asphalt east of the alleged one-eight gap existed.
It must first be noted that the condition of 1700 South beyond the crossing is the
responsibility of Salt Lake City. Even more importantly, it is conceded by Goebels that
the protuberance did not cause Mr. Goebel to fall. Indeed Mr. Goebel testified that he
steered around it. Because there is no cause in fact, the trial court ruled as a matter of
law that the alleged protuberance cannot be a proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's accident.
R. 6761 at Tr. 8-9. The trial court was correct. R. 6761 at Tr. 8-9. Since the
protuberance did not cause Mr. Goebel to fall, it cannot be concluded that "but for" the
protuberance Mr. Goebel would not have fallen. Why Mr. Goebel actually fell was never
proven. However, it is certain that he could have steered his bicycle into a dangerous
gap, if one existed, with or without any protuberance. He also could have steered his
bicycle to avoid any dangerous gap, regardless of the existence of any protuberance, just
as he successfully steered around the protuberance on a hundred prior occasions. The
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protuberance is no more a cause of Mr. Goebel's accident than the fact that Mr. Goebel
chose to ride his bicycle rather than walk or drive.
D.

Statute And Ordinance Based Law Does Not Impose Liability Without
Negligence Onto Railroads, For Allowing Small Gaps In Their
Crossings.

Goebels also attempt to turn their negligence claims into some kind of strict
liability claim by arguing in their sections VI.A.3. and VLB. that UTAH CODE ANN. § 107-26(2), § 10-7-29, § 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14-44.030 allow them to
recover from SLCSR without proving actual or constructive notice of a dangerous
condition. The trial court ruled that SLCSR owed a duty of reasonable care under these
provisions, because of its use of its easement over UTA's tracks, and that the notice
requirement applies to SLCSR's duty thereunder. R. 6668-6670. Goebels argue that
these statutes and the ordinance do not discuss a notice element, and, therefore, provide
them an absolute right to recover damages from SLCSR without proof of notice.
Goebels are wrong. In addition to requiring at least notice of a hazard, they are
inapplicable.
These provisions do not apply to SLCSR because SLCSR is not a "railway
company" or "railroad company'5 within the meaning of these statutes and ordinances.
This point is discussed in Points II.A. and III.B., infra.
In addition, even assuming they do apply to SLCSR, these provisions are
inapplicable on their face inasmuch as they do not purport to require owners of railroads
to do anything without prior notice, or to specifically eliminate less than one inch wide
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gaps in crossing surface materials. Sections 10-7-26 and 10-7-29 pertain to the powers
of cities. Section 10-7-26(2) only states that it does not exempt any railway company's
otherwise existing duty, if any, to keep a crossing in a good and safe condition. It does
not impose such a duty. It only imposes the duty to plank, pave, macadamize or do
whatever else to the crossing surface "as the governing body of the city . . . may from
time to time direct." In other words, to do what the railway is directed by the city to do.
Being "directed" to act requires a showing of much more than merely having notice of a
hazard. The city ordinance also pertains only to what the city requires railroad owners to
do within the city. Also, Section 10-7-29 only requires railroads to pave or repave their
crossing surfaces when the city paves or repaves its street, and to keep such pavement in
proper repair using whatever material "the governing body of the city may require and
order," and also to not "neglect" to keep their "tracks" in repair. There is no evidence
SLC ever required SLCSR to do anything, let alone more than what the track owners, UP
and then UTA, had done, or specifically to eliminate any gaps in between the rubber
panels. Neither SLC nor these provisions require the elimination of all gaps, no matter
how small. These provisions do nothing to impose a duty on SLCSR to do what Goebels
claim it should have done.
Moreover, these statutes, like the ordinance, exist only to allow cities, in this case
SLC, to control the conditions of their streets by being authorized to direct railroad
companies with respect to crossing surfaces and also being able to recover from railroad
companies the expenses incurred should any city act to maintain any crossing surface
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itself when the responsible railroad company did not do as directed by the city. These
provisions do not provide private causes of action.
Sections 56-1-11 and 10-7-29 also do not impose strict liability on railroads.
Section 56-1-11 provides that companies who own or operate railroads (tracks) will be
liable for damages caused by their "neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient
crossings." Section 10-7-29 is violated only "by reason of neglect to keep . .. tracks in
repair." These statutes do not specifically prohibit small gaps, and they do not require
perfectly smooth crossings. A crossing is good and sufficient if it has inconsequential
gaps. Moreover, both statutes require the proscribed condition to result from the railroad
owner's "neglect." Synonyms for"neglect" are "disregard" and "ignore." See Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary at 791 (1988). These terms all suggest some level of
scienter, the actual intent not to do something for a substantial period of time. Contrary
to Goebels' suggestion, "neglect" is not some level of wrongdoing that is less culpable
than negligence. At a minimum, one would have to be negligent in order to violate a
statute that requires "neglect." More importantly, one cannot neglect, ignore or disregard
something of which he or she is unaware. Notice of the defective crossing condition
remains an element and these statutes do not provide a cause of action where common
law negligence does not.
Goebels' mistake is revealed clearly in the authority upon which they rely. In
York v. Pennsylvania RR Co.. 56 N.E.2d 341 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943), a case with very
limited subsequent citation only within Ohio, the court was faced with a statute that
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provided, as described by the court, "that a railroad company shall maintain . . . safe and
sufficient crossings and such company shall be liable for all damages sustained . . . by
reason of the want or insufficiency of such crossing." Id- at 344 (emphasis added). That
court held that notice was not necessary because the statute before it imposed absolute
liability. Similarly, in Moreland v. Directors General of Railroads,! 14 A. 424, 425 (N.J.
1921), the parties agreed that the particular New Jersey statute at issue in that case
imposed an absolute duty to "keep in repair." In Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Rv
v. Red, 47 111. App. 662 (111. 1893) notice was not an issue inasmuch as "[i]t was shown
that this crossing had been out of order for nearly a month." Id. at 664. The statutes and
ordinance cited in the case at bar do not impose strict liability or absolute duties, without
notice.
In addition to these old cases from other states construing different statutes,
Goebels also cite a Utah case that discusses § 56-1-1 lfs predecessor. This Utah case
undermines Goebels's position. In Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co.,171 P. 999 (Utah
1918), the court made a point of stating that the evidence was sufficient to prove the
crossing was dangerous and unsafe "for a long time." 171 P. at 1002. Indeed, the court
stated in dicta that it would be proper to instruct the jury that it should consider the
surrounding circumstances in determining whether the statute was violated. This, of
course, means that a railroad owner also has to be aware of the circumstances to be able
to comply with the duty imposed by the statute. Id. No Utah case is known to hold that
§ 56-1-11, or any other Utah statute or ordinance, imposes an absolute duty to correct

-35-

hazards without notice of the circumstances, including whether there is an existing
hazard. Goebels contend Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific RR Co., 186 P.2d 293 (Utah
1947), does not expressly require notice, but that is because that issue was not before the
court. Neither does that case hold notice is not required. Like Denkers, the Van
Wagoner court simply upheld a jury instruction that stated a "good and sufficient"
crossing is one that is ordinarily safe under the circumstances. Id- at 305.
II.
SLCSR'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED FOR OTHER REASONS.
A.

The Statutes And City Ordinance Relied Upon To Impose Certain
Duties Regarding Maintenance Of Railroad Crossings Are Not
Applicable To SLCSR Who Did Not Own Or Operate The "Railroad."

The trial court has ruled in dicta that the duties imposed by UTAH CODE ANN. §
10-7-26, § 10-7-29, § 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030 upon the
owners and operators of "railroads" applied in this case to SLCSR. The trial court erred
in that ruling, and SLCSR asks that the Court reverse that ruling, even if it otherwise
affirms the Judgment for SLCSR.
A "railway company" is a company that "owns or operates railway tracks," § 107-26(1), or that owns or operates a "railway," § 10-7-29. (Emphasis added.) SLCSR
does not own or operate a railway; it only operates trains over UTA's railway for freight
service purposes. For the purpose of these provisions, a "railway" is a roadway with
rails. The ownership of a "railroad" is not defined by the ownership or use of
locomotives or rolling stock. An entity may own a "railroad" (the tracks) without
owning any railroad equipment or an entity may have the right to use some other entity's
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"railroad" (such as Amtrak operating trains over UP tracks) without becoming the entity
responsible for the statutory obligations concerning crossings. In this case, UTA owned
and operated (controlled access to) the tracks where they crossed 1700 South. SLCSR's
freight service easement was merely a grant of limited access to use UTA's railroad. It
did not make SLCSR an owner or operator of the tracks so as to make any statutory
duties to maintain crossings for bicyclists or others applicable to SLCSR. It only makes
sense that inasmuch as these provisions pertain to real property, that the owners or those
who control the use of the property (lessees), should have the obligations concerning
what is done with the property.
B.

As A Matter Of Public Policy, SLCSR Could Not Have A Legal Duty
To Make UTA's Crossing Surface So Smooth That There Would Be
No Gap Wide Enough To Accommodate Any Bicycle Tire.

Railroads are not required to keep crossing surfaces absolutely safe for bicyclists.
All roadways need only be kept "'in a reasonably safe condition for travel.'" Braithwaite
v. West Valley City Corp.. 921 P.2d 997, 998 (Utah 1996) (quoting Braithwaite v. West
Valley City Corp.. 860 P.2d 336, 338 (Utah 1993)). See also. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power
& Light. 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998). Moreover, streets need not be kept reasonably
safe for all travelers, but only for those "exercising due care for their own safety."
Pollari v. Salt Lake City. 176 P.2d 111,116 (Utah 1947) (emphasis added).
[T]he owner of property is not to be regarded as an insurer for even an invitee
upon his property. His duties toward invitees are limited [to] those risks which
are unreasonable, which he has no reason to believe such persons will discover or
realize the risk involved, and which he has reason to anticipate that persons acting
with ordinary and reasonable care will encounter.
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Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 396 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1964)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added): see English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah
1993) (possessor of land has duty to protect invitee against only the hazards "which the
possessor should expect the invitee will not discover or realize"). Also, a defendant is
not obligated to correct an alleged defect when doing so "would . . . reduce the likelihood
of injury so minimally that to impose the duty would be unduly burdensome." Slisze v.
Stanley-Bostich. 1999 UT 20, H 13, 979 P.2d 317, 320.
There are scores of cases in which roadways with defects of the type Goebels
allege have been found to be reasonably safe as a matter of law. For example, Hindman
v. State Department of Highways and Public Transp., 906 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994), involved a bicycle accident in which the bicyclist hit a 214" tall bump on the
shoulder of a street. In affirming summary judgement for the defendant, the court stated,
minor flaws in road shoulders are neither unexpected nor unusual, and, though
[plaintiff], as a cyclist, had a perfect right to be traveling on the shoulder rather
than the main road, imperfections such as the one he encountered on this occasion
are conditions that cyclists can and should anticipate when riding on a shoulder.
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).5 Many of these courts base their holdings on the significant
expense involved in guarding against injury caused by such slight imperfections:

5

See also Ursino v. Big Bov Restaurants of America, 237 Cal. Rptr. 413,415 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); Birckv. Citvof Ouincv. 608 N.E.2d 920, 924-25 (111. Ct. App. 1993); New
York Central R.R. Co. v. SholL 146 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 1957); BarnettHoldgraf v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. 3 P.3d 89, 90, 94 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000);
Orleans Parish School Bd. v. City of New Orleans. 585 So. 2d 643, 647 (La. Ct. App.
1991); Kinchen v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 114, 119 (La. Ct. App. 1967);
Buffington v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co.. 188 So. 563, 563 (Miss. 1939); Brooks v. New York
State ThruwavAuth.. 423 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
-38-

The size of the defect could change with the temperature, with the seasons, and
from year to year, and it would be a virtually impossible burden to place on a
municipality to inspect and repair hundreds of miles of [travel surfaces]. Common
sense would dictate that the economic burden placed on a municipality for such an
undertaking would be significant. Birck v. City of Quincy, 608 N.E.2d 920, 923
(IU.Ct.App. 1993).
The costs involved are "outrageously high" where the risk of harm was
only slight to begin with: "The State has thousands of miles of roadways
which have great utility value and are vital to the public. The cost to repair
every pothole or minor crack would be outrageously high. The probability
and gravity of harm posed by [such] defect[s]... is insignificant." Orleans
v. Parish School Bd.. 585 So. 2d at 647.
Before Mr. Goebel's accident, no one familiar with railroad crossings had ever
heard of a bicycle accident involving such gaps in crossing surfaces. Moreover, the
subject crossing was commonly used by bicyclists before and after Mr. Goebel's accident
without incident or complaint. As stated in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Wright 126
S.W.2d 609, 613 (Ark. 1939), there can be no better proof on the issue of whether the
crossing was in a reasonably safe condition for the ordinary use of the traveling public
than that it was frequently used without incident. As a matter of public policy, the
burden of preventing accidents from small gaps in seams at railroad crossings, should be
placed on bicyclists where it most reasonably belongs. See City of Knoxville v. Cooper,
265 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953). Not only is such a simple precaution by
bicyclists a matter of common sense, it is mandated by applicable law, as discussed
further in subsection C. below.
C.

There Was No Evidence Presented To Prove That This Accident Was
Reasonably Foreseeable Even With Notice Of The Alleged Gap.

"The existence of a duty of reasonable care depends in part on the extent to
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which a reasonable person can foresee that his acts may create a significant likelihood of
causing harm to others.'" AMS Salt Indus.. Inc.. 942 P.2d at 321 (quoting Cruz v.
Middlecauff Lincoln-Mercury, 909 P.2d 12525 1258 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, Assoc. C.J.,
concurring)); Slisze v. Stanlev-Bostitch. 1999 UT 20, f 11-12, 979 P.2d 317, 320. As
the United States Supreme Court explained:
It has been well said that, "if men went about to guard themselves against every
risk to themselves or others which might by ingenious conjecture be conceived as
possible, human affairs could not be carried on at all. The reasonable man, then,
to whose ideal behavior we are to look as the standard of duty, will neither neglect
what he can forecast as probable, nor waste his anxiety on events that are barely
possible. He will order his precaution by the measure of what appears likely in the
known course of things."
Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U.S. 1, 9 (1909) (quoting Pollock,
Torts 41 (8th ed.)). Also, "in [deciding] whether the defendant should have been expected
to take further precautions to avoid injury .. ., it is only fair and proper to make that
determination from the standpoint of foresight and not hindsight." Long v. Smith Food
King. 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973).
In this case, it was not reasonably foreseeable to SLCSR or anyone else that gaps
like the gap in this case would cause a bicycle accident. Every single witness in this case
who was familiar with railroad crossings, testified that while small gaps in railroad
crossings are common, they had never heard or even conceived of a bicycle accident
involving a small gap between crossing panels. Indeed, it was far from proven that this
accident was caused by any gap between crossing panels.
A ruling that SLCSR had a duty to remedy the alleged gap in the subject crossing
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also would require a finding that SLCSR should have foreseen that Mr. Goebel would
ignore his obligation to exercise care for his own safety. For his accident to have
occurred as Goebels allege, Mr. Goebel would have had to break applicable law
requiring him to keep a lookout and ride slow enough to see and avoid observable
surface hazards. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46(l)(a), § 41-6-84(1) and Salt Lake City
Ordinance § 12.36.010. See also Solt v. Godfrey. 479 P.2d 474, 475-476 (Utah 1971);
McAllister v. Bvbee, 425 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1967); Mingus v. Olsson. 201 P.2d 495,
499 (Utah 1949). The gap Goebels allege caused Mr. Goebel's accident was not hidden;
it was just as observable to Mr. Goebel as Goebels claim it was to SLCSR.
Goebels must prove that an accident involving the alleged gap was reasonably
foreseeable, not merely possible.6 Because Goebels had no evidence to satisfy this
burden, their claims against SLCSR should have been dismissed.
D.

There Was No Evidence To Prove That The Alleged Gap In Fact
Existed To A Width, Depth And Length That Mr. Goebel's Bicycle
Tires Could Fit Into It.

Even assuming SLCSR had a duty with respect to UTA's crossing surfaces to
reduce gaps which are wide enough to accommodate bicycle tires, Goebels have no
evidence that SLCSR breached that duty as to the subject gap. No one noticed a gap in
the crossing before Mr. Goebel's accident. As the witnesses familiar with railroad

6

See Knoxville v. Cooper, 265 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. App. 1953); Alabama Great SLCSR
R. Co. v. Bishop, 68 So. 2d 530, 532-33 (Ala. 1953); Bowie v. Missouri Pacific R.R.
Co,, 561 S.W.2d314,316(Ark. 1978): Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Richardson. 47
S.W.2d 794, 795 (Ark. 1932); Humphrey v. City of Pes Moines, 20 N.W.2d 25, 28
(Iowa 1945).
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crossings testified, a gap can form "very quickly" and "all at once," including by
"vehicles impacting directly on a crossing surface" and "dragging equipment on the
railroad or snowplows on the highway side." R. 2545-2548, 2557 (p. 46); 2557 (p. 54),
2558 (p.57) - 2560, 2563-2564, 2566; see also R. 2178-2179, 2181, 2196. In this case,
some of the pads in question clearly have been violently struck by snow plows or
something else. See the scrape marks apparent on the pads in Exhibits D-4 and P-l 1,
Addendum at Tabs 9 and 10. In addition, gaps most often are filled with debris. Thus,
the subject gap could have been created after Mr. GoebePs accident, or filled with debris
before the day of the accident.
GoebePs expert testified that the subject one-eight gap was "hour-glass" shaped,
being widest at the ends. R. 6766 at Tr. 822, 900-01; Pltfs' Ex. 62. After the accident,
the ends were measured only twice before the crossing was removed. In March, they
were measured to be 3/4" at both ends, and, in July, they were measured to be .812" at
the east end and .698" at the west end. R. 6767 at Tr. 1175-84. The east end of the gap
was larger and the west end smaller than when measured in March, but the July
measurements were with a more precise instrument, and the differences were within the
margin of error. Thus, there may have been no actual difference in the size of the gap
when measured at the ends in March and July. In July, the one-eight gap was measured
in between the ends at two inch increments. Starting from the East end of the gap the
measurements were: .812", .725", .600", .498", .563", .587", .592", .604", .645", .670"
and .698". See R. 6767 at Tr. 1181-1183 and Ex. D-1 and P-62. Except for the first two
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inches at the east end of the gap, all these measurements demonstrate the gap to be too
narrow to accommodate Mr. Goebel's .724" wide rim. See R. 6765 at Tr. 778, 805-06;
6766 at Tr. 900-01; Pltf.'s Ex. 62.
Even plaintiffs' expert Mr. Ingebretsen opined that Mr. Goebel's wheel could not
have fit into a gap unless it was .725" or wider. He also testified that the wheel had to
travel the full 21" length of the one-eight gap, at the 22-30 feet per second Mr. Goebel
was traveling, to be able to have time to fall far enough to make the impact with the rail
significant.7 R. 6766 at Tr. 825-26, 867-74, 902-03, 937-47.
E.

There Was No Evidence To Prove That The Alleged Gap,
Assuming It Existed, Was The Cause Of Mr. Goebel's Accident

Goebels also must prove that SLCSR's alleged breach of duty caused Mr.
Goebel's accident. "In every case, negligence and proximate cause are 'separate and
distinct factors in assigning tort liability.' Proof of negligence is never 'enough by itself
to establish liability; it must also be proved that negligence was a cause of the event
which produced the injury or harm sustained by the one who brings the complaint.'"
Holmstrom v. C.R. England. Inc.. 2000 UT App. 239, ^ 32, 8 P.3d 281, 290 (emphasis in
original) (quoting 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 438 (1989)). See also, Weber v.
Springville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986). To satisfy their burden, Goebels
must prove that SLCSR's alleged negligence-failing to reduce the width of the alleged
gap in the subject crossing-"played a substantial role in causing the injuries." 2000 UT
7

SLCSR's expert believed the 21 inch length was not long enough because the wheel
would have to fall at least 3 inches before it struck the rail to produce the observed dent
in the front rim. See page 11 and 12, supra.
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App. 239, If 36,1| 45; see Mitchell v. Pearson Enter.. 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985).
Goebels can satisfy their burden only with "direct evidence," not conjecture or
speculation. Mitchell. 697 P.2d at 246. See also. Mahmood v. Ross. 1999 UT 104, % 23,
990 P.2d 933, 938; Bansasine v. Bodell. 927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments. Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
McAllister v. Bvbee. 425 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1967).
For the reasons discussed above in Point H.E., Goebels clearly cannot prove the
subject gap at issue caused Mr. Goebel's accident. The incontrovertible physical
evidence, the width and length of that gap, precludes that finding. However, even
without the physical evidence, assuming the gap was wide and long enough, Goebels still
cannot prove causation. There is not a scintilla of evidence to support this speculation.
No witness, including Mr. Goebel, has testified that Mr. Goebel's tires went into any
"gap" between the crossing panels. After the accident, every witness who went to the
crossing to try to surmise what happened failed to conclude the subject one-eight gap
could have been the cause.
The speculation that Mr. Goebel's tires became trapped in a gap between the pads
has its genesis in Mrs. Goebel's imagination. Two or three days after the accident, she
went to the scene and deduced that Mr. Goebel's front tire became trapped in the seam
between panels two and seven and three and six. For over a year, it was Goebels' claim
that the bicycle wheels became wedged in that particular gap - not that they were
channeled along a different 21" long gap into a rail. Later, Goebels' expert ruled out the
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gap Mrs. Goebel identified because the damage to Mr. Goebel's front tire is inconsistent
with it having been "wedged" between the pads. Goebels now surmise that the front tire
had to have struck an object at the end of the gap, like a rail, and there was simply no
such object at the end of the gap Mrs. Goebel believed was the cause of the accident..
In sum, one may speculate as to any number of theories as to how this accident
happened. Because there was an unusual amount of bumper to bumper traffic to his left
and he was traveling too fast to go over the protuberance, Mr. Goebel may have angled
off the crossing to the north (his right) as SLCSR's expert, Mr. Woolley, concluded. He
may have simply struck an object (rock, brick, cement block, piece of iron) that was later
moved out of the way. He could have simply turned too sharply into the flange way or
lost control. All such theories, including Goebels1 initial and latest trial theories, are at
best theories. There is no direct evidence that a gap caused this accident. There is only
speculation and conjecture.8

III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S
OTHER RULINGS FOR WHICH GOEBELS DO NOT CLAIM REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
A.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Excluding Evidence
Of Testing Done At A Different Crossing, With Respect To A Different Gap Under
8

See also Foster v. New York Cent. Sys.. 402 F.2d 312, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1968);
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Wright 126 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Ark. 1939); Castellaw v.
Pollard. 183 S.E. 927, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936): Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Craig. 219
S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948); Arceneaux v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 12
So. 2d 733, 736 (La. Ct. App. 1943): Mississippi Export R.R. Co. v. Miller. 193 So. 2d
134, 136-137 (Miss. 1966); Buffmgton v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co.. 188 So. 563, 563 (Miss.
1939); Brooks v. New York State Thruwav Auth.. 423 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979); Keirstead v. City of New York, 260 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (N.Y. App. Div.
1965); Foreman v. Chicago. R. I & P. Rv. Co.. 74 P.2d 350, 352 (Okla. 1937).
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Different Conditions When Offered To Support The Proposition Of Whether Mr.
Goebel's Bicycle Tires Actually Could Fit Into The Specific Alleged Gap, Whatever
Size It Was, On The Day Of The Accident.
What Goebels complain about in their Point VLB. is that the trial court would not
let Mr. Ingebretsen testify about his efforts to get a bicycle tire into a different gap at a
different crossing under different circumstances, with different widths along the gap, as
support for his opinion that Mr. Goebel's tire could fit into the subject gap. The crossing
Mr. Ingebretsen used was owned by UP and was in a state of repair much worse than the
1700 South crossing. The trial court exercised its discretion not to allow testimony and
photographs concerning that crossing because it was unduly prejudicial and potentially
misleading. R. 6766 at Tr. 848-849. Mr. Ingebretsen was allowed to opine that the tire
and wheel would fit into any gap wider than .724 inches.
Goebels argue to this Court, as they did to the trial court, that evidence of
experiments at a different crossing would not be misleading and would assist the trier of
fact, but Goebels do not attempt to meet their burden of showing that the trial court's
discretionary ruling under the circumstances at the time was so unreasonable that it
should be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of its broad discretion.
See Gerbich v. Numed. Inc.. 1999 UT 37, ^ 16, 977 P.2d 1205; A.K. & R Whipple
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr.. 1999 UT App. 87, % 11, 977 P.2d 518. Goebels
cannot prevail on this point by simply rearguing here the position on which they lost
below. They must show how the trial court abused its discretion other than merely
stating that they believe its decision was wrong.
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Moreover, Goebels do not even attempt to explain how the trial court is wrong by
showing how the excluded testimony would assist the jury or not be misleading. SLCSR
should not be expected to argue this point in a vacuum, and therefore simply is left to
refer this Court to its argument made to the trial court at R. 6766 (Tr. 840-849), should
this Court choose to reconsider that issue and make its own evidentiary ruling.
B.
SLCSR DID NOT ASSUME UTA'S DUTY TO MAINTAIN UTA'S
"RAILROAD" FOR ANY PURPOSES OTHER THAN TO MAINTAIN THE
TRACK FOR FREIGHT SERVICES, AND THE ELIMINATION OF GAPS FOR
BICYCLE SAFETY IS NOT NECESSARY FOR FREIGHT SERVICE.
SLCSR did not assume any duty UTA, as the railroad owner, owed to bicyclists to
eliminate small gaps from UTA's crossing surfaces. There is absolutely no evidence
whatsoever that SLCSR tried to eliminate gaps of that nature, and Goebels never have
argued otherwise. However, Goebels did argue before the trial court that SLCSR
assumed the duty to do so through its coordination agreement with UTA or otherwise
somehow voluntarily undertook that duty within the meaning of Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 324A (1965). The trial court disagreed, ruling no duty of care was owed by
SLCSR to Goebels under SLCSR's agreement with UTA or § 342A. R. 6669,
paragraphs 2 and 3. Goebels now argue in their Points VLB. and D. that the trial court
was wrong, although they admit such error is not sufficient to require a new trial.
Goebels ask the Court to consider this issue only in the event this case is remanded for a
new trial. The trial court was correct in its ruling on this issue.
The SLCSR/UTA agreement at paragraph 2.1, that:
[SLCSR] shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not conduct,
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directly or indirectly,... any other activity whatsoever on the Right-of-Way
that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service.
Goebels' Addendum at 48-49. "Freight Rail Service" is defined in the agreement as "the
common carrier rail freight operations to be conducted by [SLCSR] on the Right-ofWay." Id. at 45. Filling or reducing small gaps on crossing surfaces for bicyclists was
not necessary to freight operations. The agreement further provides that SLCSR was to
maintain the trackage it used "to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail
Service; provided that [SLCSR] shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the
Freight Trackage [or Joint Trackage] so as to preserve the present condition of... grade
crossings . . ., as described on Exhibit "B" hereto." Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added).
Goebels left out the above-underlined language when they quoted limited parts of
paragraphs 3.1 and 3.3 in their Brief. Exhibit "B" of the agreement, which states that the
grade crossings "are in good condition," must be read in context with Paragraph 2.1,
which unambiguously relieves SLCSR of the obligation to conduct, and forbids SLCSR
from conducting, any maintenance on UTA's railroad not strictly necessary for freight
operations. Thus, the agreement's reference to the condition of grade crossings required
SLCSR to keep crossings in "good condition" for freight rail service. If anything,
Exhibit B qualifies SLCSR's exercise of discretion to maintain UTA's railroad as "it
deems necessary" for freight service; it does not expand SLCSR's maintenance
obligations beyond what is "necessary to Freight Rail Service."
SLCSR does not contend, as Goebels erroneously claim, that Section 2.1 nullifies
Sections 3.1 and 3.3. To the contrary, SLCSR only contends that these sections must be
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read together and they must be read in their entirety without taking parts out of context.
When read in its entirety, the agreement is not ambiguous, and the trial court's ruling is a
correct interpretation of the agreement.
Goebels' only other alleged basis for imposing a legal duty on SLCSR to prevent
Mr. Goebel's accident is the "Good Samaritan Doctrine" set forth in Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 324A. That section provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon
the undertaking.
Goebels do nothing to suggest to how § 324A fits any aspect of the case at bar. SLCSR
did not undertake any duty of UTA to eliminate gaps in rubber panels at UTA's
crossings, and even if it had, its failure to eliminate the subject gap did not increase any
risk of harm from that gap. Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT 115, HH 31-33, 61 P.3d 1068,
relied upon by Goebels, does nothing to further their cause. Goebels did not and cannot
establish § 324A's requirement of an undertaking by SLCSR for the protection of Mr.
Goebel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, SLCSR respectfully requests that the trial court's
directed verdict in favor of SLCSR be affirmed and that this Court determine that the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-26, 10-7-29 and 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City
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Ordinance 14.44.030 do not apply to SLCSR under the facts of this case.
DATED this }Z ~"day of August, 2003.
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey

E. Scott Savage
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
Salt Lake City SLCSR Railroad Company, Inc.
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ADDENDUM

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 10-7-26

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 10-7-29

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 56-1-11

Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030
Leave To Amend Order R. 1466-1472
Directed Verdict Order R. 6668-6672
Judgment R. 6673-6674
Exhibit P-54
Exhibit D-4
Exhibit P-11
Exhibit D-l
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Tabl

MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF CITIES AND TOWNS

10-7-26

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Effect of stipulation, in public
building or construction contract, that alterations or extras must be ordered in writing, 1
A L R 3d 1273
Revocation, prior to execution of formal written contract, of vote or decisions ofpubhc body
awarding contract to bidder, 3 A L R 3d 864
Immunity from tort liability, right of contractor with federal, state, or local public body to
latter s, 9 A L R 3d 382
Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of
public contract, 15 A L R 3d 733
Validity of statute^ ordinance, or charter provision requiring that workmen on public works
be paid the prevailing or current rate of wages,
18 A L R 3d 944
Right of municipal corporations to recover
back from contractor payments made under
contract violating competitive bidding statute.
33 A L R 3d 397
Liability of municipality on quasi-contract
for value of property or work furnished without
compliance with bidding requirements, 33
A L R 3d 1164
Construction and operation of 'equal opportunities clause" requiring pledge against racial
discrimination in hiring under construction
contract, 44 A L R 3d 1283
Validity and construction of 'no damage"
clause with respect to delay m building or
construction contract, 74 A L R 3d 187
Construction contract provision excusing delay caused by "severe weather,' 85 A L R 3d
1085

Dutv o( public authority to disclose to contractor information, alleged!} in his possession
affecting cost or feasibility of project 86
A L R 3d 182
Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid was
based upon his own mistake or that of his
employee 2 A L R 4th 991
Waiver of competitive bidding requirements
for state and local public building and construction contracts, 40 A L R 4th 968
Public contracts authority of state or its
subdivision to reject all bids, 52 A L R 4th 186
Public contracts low bidder s monetary relief
against state or local agency for nonaward of
contract, 65 A L R 4th 93
What are 'prevailing uages * or the like, for
purposes of state statute requiring pavment of
prevailing wages on public works projects 7
A L R 5th 400
Emplovers subject to -tate statutes requiring
pavment of prevailing wages on public works
projects 7 A L R 5th 444
What projects involve work subject to state
statutes requiring payment of prevailing wages
on public projects 10 A L R 5th 337
Authority of state municipality or other governmental entitv to accent late bids for public
works contracts, 49 A L R oth 747
Standing of disappointed bidder on public
contract to seek damages under 42 USCS
§ 1983 for public authorities alleged violation
of bidding procedures, 86 A L R Fed 904

ARTICLE 7
LEVY OF SPECIAL TAXES BY CITIES AND TOWNS
10-7-21 to 10-7-25-

Repealed.

Repeals. — Sections 10-7-21 to 10-7-25
(Utah Code Annotated 1953, L 1965, ch 12.
§ 1), relating to improvements and the levy of

special taxes by cities and towns, were repealed
by Laws 1969, ch 27, § 43 For present provisions, see § 17A-3-301 et =>eq

10-7-26. Streets and alleys used by railway companies(1) As used in this section and in Sections 10-7-27, 10-7-29. 10-7-30, 10-7-31,
10-7-32, and 10-7-33, the terms ''railway company" or "street railway company''
means any company which owns or operates railway tracks on. along or across
a street or alley in any city or town
(2) Nothing contained in this section or in the sections referred to in
Subsection (1) shall be construed to exempt any railway company from keeping
every portion of every street and alley used by it and upon or across which
tracks shall be constructed at or near the grade of such streets in good and safe
485

10-7-27

UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same planked, paved,
macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the governing
body of the city or town may from time to time direct, keeping the plank,
pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top of the rails
of the track. The portions of the streets or alleys to be so kept and maintained
by all such railway companies shall include all the space between their
different rails and tracks and also a space outside of the outer rail of each
outside track of at least two feet in width, and the tracks herein referred to
shall include not only the main tracks but also all sidetracks, crossings and
turnouts constructed for the use of such railways.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 259; C.L.
1917, § 677; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-25; L.
1969, ch. 27, § 42.

Cross-References. — Municipal Improvement District Act, § 17A-3-301 et seq.

10-7-27. Street railway companies to restore streets.
Every street railway company shall at its own expense restore the pavement,
including the foundation thereof, of every street disturbed by it in the
construction, reconstruction, removal or repair of its tracks, to the same
condition as before the disturbance thereof, to the satisfaction of the governing
body having charge of such street. The obligation imposed hereby shall, in
cities other than cities of the first class, be in lieu and substitution of any and
all other obligations of any such company to pave, repave or repair any street,
or to pay any part of the cost thereof, and may be enforced in the same manner
as similar obligations are or may be enforced under the laws of this state.
Nothing herein contained shall be considered to relieve any such company
from the repayment of any money which has heretofore been advanced or
expended by any city for any paving heretofore done under or by virtue of a
specific contract or agreement made and entered into between the board of
commissioners or the city council of any city and such company providing for
the repayment thereof, but the obligation for such repayment shall be and
remain enforceable as if this section had not been passed.
History: L. 1927, ch. 77, § 1; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-7-26.

10-7-28.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 10-7-28 (L. 1927, ch. 77,
§ 2; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-27), relating to
the liability of abutting property for street

paving costs, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch.
27, § 43. For present provisions, see § 17A-3301 et seq.

10-7-29. Railway companies to repave streets.
All railway companies shall be required to pave or repave at their own cost
all the space between their different rails and tracks and also a space two feet
wide outside of the outer rails of the outside tracks in any city or town,
including all sidetracks, crossings and turnouts used by such companies.
Where two or more companies occupy the same street or alley with separate
tracks each company shall be responsible for its proportion of the surface of the
street or alley occupied by all the parallel tracks as herein required. Such
paving or repaving by such railway companies shall be done at the same time
486
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10-7-27

UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

condition for public travel, but it shall keep the same planked, paved,
macadamized or otherwise in such condition for public travel as the governing
body of the city or town may from time to time direct, keeping the plank,
pavement or other surface of the street or alley level with the top of the rails
of the track. The portions of the streets or alleys to be so kept and maintained
by all such railway companies shall include all the space between their
different rails and tracks and also a space outside of the outer rail of each
outside track of at least two feet in width, and the tracks herein referred to
shall include not only the main tracks but also all sidetracks, crossings and
turnouts constructed for the use of such railways.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 259; C.L.
1917, § 677; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-25; L.
1969, ch. 27, § 42.

Cross-References. — Municipal Improvement District Act, § 17A-3-301 et seq.

10-7-27. Street railway companies to restore streets.
Every street railway company shall at its own expense restore the pavement,
including the foundation thereof of every street disturbed by it in the
construction, reconstruction, removal or repair of its tracks, to the same
condition as before the disturbance thereof, to the satisfaction of the governing
body having charge of such street. The obligation imposed hereby shall, in
cities other than cities of the first class, be in lieu and substitution of any and
all other obligations of any such company to pave, repave or repair any street,
or to pay any part of the cost thereof, and may be enforced in the same manner
as similar obligations are or may be enforced under the laws of this state.
Nothing herein contained shall be considered to relieve any such company
from the repayment of any money which has heretofore been advanced or
expended by any city for any paving heretofore done under or by virtue of a
specific contract or agreement made and entered into between the board of
commissioners or the city council of any city and such company providing for
the repayment thereof, but the obligation for such repayment shall be and
remain enforceable as if this section had not been passed.
History: L. 1927, ch. 77, § 1; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-7-26.

10-7-28.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Section 10-7-28 (L. 1927, ch. 77,
§ 2; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-27), relating to
the liability of abutting property for street

pavmg costs, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch.
27, § 43. For present provisions, see § 17A-3301 et seq.

10-7-29, Railway companies to repave streetSc
All railway companies shall be required to pave or repave at their own cost
all the space between their different rails and tracks and also a space two feet
wide outside of the outer rails of the outside tracks in any city or town,
including all sidetracks, crossings and turnouts used by such companies.
Where two or more companies occupy the same street or alley with separate
tracks each company shall be responsible for its proportion of the surface of the
street or alley occupied by all the parallel tracks as herein required. Such
paving or repaving by such railwav companies shall be done at the same time
486
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10-7-30

and shall be of the same material and character as the paving or repaving of
the streets or alleys upon which the track or tracks are located, unless other
material is specially ordered by the municipality. Such railway companies
shall be required to keep that portion of the street which they are herein
required to pave or repave in good and proper repair, using for that purpose the
same material as the street upon_which the track or tracks are laid at the point
of repair or such other material as the governing body of the city may require
and order; and as streets are hereafter paved or repaved street railway
companies shall be required to lay in the best approved manner a rail to be
approved by the governing body of the city. The tracks of all railway companies
when located upon the streets or avenues of a city or town shall be kept in
repair and safe in all respects for the use of the traveling public, and such
companies shall be liable for all damages resulting by reason of neglect to keep
such tracks in repair, or for obstructing the streets. For injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of any such company to keep its tracks in
proper repair and free from obstructions such company shall be liable and the
city or town shall be exempt from liability. The word "railway companies" as
used in this section shall be taken to mean and include any persons,
companies, corporations or associations owning or operating any street or
other railway in any city or town.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 266; C.L.
1917, § 684; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-7-28.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
.
Duty to repair streets.
Protest against improvement.
Revocation of franchise.
Duty to repair streets.
Street railroad was not liable for injuries to
person driving a horse-drawn cart which overturned when it ran upon a pile of stone left in
the street by a party which had contracted with
the city and the railroad to build a crosswalk, in
absence of evidence that the railway track was
out of repair or that there was any obstruction
upon it at the time of accident. Naylor v. Salt
Lake City, 9 Utah 491, 35 P. 509 (1894).

street included within a proposed paving district had the right to file its protest to the
proposed improvement the same as any other
private
street

owner

of

property

fronting

on

C a v e y Q g d e n City> 5 1 U t a h 166> 1 6 9

the
p

163 (1917).
Revocation of franchise.
City could revoke a franchise and require a
railroad to remove its tracks for refusal to abide
by a covenant of the franchise ordinance requiring the track to conform to any changes in
grade made by the city. Union Pac. R.R. v.
Public Service Comm., 103 Utah 186r 134 P.2d
469 (1943).

Protest against improvement.
Railroad company owning lots abutting on a

10-7-30. Failure to pay for repairs — Lien on company's
property.
In the event of the refusal of any such company to pave, repave or repair as
required herein when so directed, upon the paving or repaving of any street
upon which its track is laid, the municipality shall have the power to pave,
repave or repair the same, and the cost and expense of such paving, repaving
or repairing may be collected by levy and sale of any property of such company
in the same manner as special taxes are now or may be collected. SpeciaTtaxes
for the purpose of paying the cost of any such paving or repaving, macadam487
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RAILROADS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Compliance with section.
Consent of freeholders.
Compliance with section.
County commissioners and not railroads are
judges of compliance with this section,
Barboglio v. Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385
(1923)
Consent of freeholders.
In an action against a railroad for obstruction
of an old county road, it was held that this

section granted certain privileges to the railroad to construct its track upon a highway in a
canyon, pass, or defile which were not limited
b y f o r m e r § 1 7 _ 5 . 3 8 j providing for consent of
freeholders when public roads were changed, or
b
? § 56'1'8' Railroad's right under this section
was limited only by this section so that where
railroad complied with it with reference to
construction of new road, freeholder along old
road was not entitled to injunction for removal
of obstruction but was limited to damages for
the obstruction. Barboglio v. Gibson, 61 Utah
314, 213 P. 385 (1923).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . JUT. 2d. — 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads
§ 69.

C.J.S. — 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 114.

56-1-10. Maps of final location to be filed.
Every company constructing or operating a railroad in this state shall within
a reasonable time after the final location of the road file with the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code a map thereof showing the route decided
upon and the land obtained for the use thereof; and like maps of the several
parts thereof located in the several counties through or into which the road
may be extended shall be filed in the offices of the recorders of such counties
respectively. Maps and profiles certified by the chief engineer, the president,
and the secretary of the company shall be filed in the office of the company
subject to examination by any person interested.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 441; C.L.
1917, § 1235; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 77-0-10; L.
1984, ch. 67, § 28.

Cross-References. — Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, Title 13, Chapter
la.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 63.

56-1-11. Maintenance of crossings.
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 445; C.L.
1917, § 1237; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 77-0-11.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Gates at crossings,
§ 10-8-83.

Regulation of crossings, § 10-8-34 et seq.
Stopping at crossings, duties of buses and
certain trucks, § 41-6-97.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

56-1-11

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Contributory negligence.
Duty owed public by railroad.
"Good and sufficient crossing."
—Instructions.
—Questions of law and fact.
Pleading.
Contributory n e g l i g e n c e .
Plaintiff who was driving horse-drawn, covered milk wagon alongside railroad track in
place of safety and without looking attempted
to cross track in front of engine whereupon he
was struck was negligent as a matter of law
and was not entitled to recovery for personal
injuries on ground that defendant railroad
could, by exercise of ordinary care, have seen
him going into place of danger and prevented
accident. Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R.R.,
35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466 (1909).
Duty o w e d public by railroad.
One driving his sheep along a public street
through which a railroad ran was not trespasser, thus the railroad owed him a duty not
only to operate its train with due care after
discovering the sheep on the track and in perilous situation, but also to use care in operation
of its train in anticipation of dangers that
might reasonably be expected to arise from the
proper use of the highway by the public. Smith
v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390,100
P. 673 (1909).
Under this section, a railroad has a duty to
the traveling public to maintain good and sufficient crossings, and is liable for unsafe crossings regardless of materials used for its construction or maintenance. Van Wagoner v.
Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293
(1947), opinion amended and rehearing denied,
112 Utah 218, 189 P2d 701 (1948).
"Good and sufficient crossing."
—Instructions.
Instruction that "good and sufficient crossing* is crossing that is sufficient and ordinarily
safe for traveling public to pass to and fro over,
keeping in mind its location, whether in
sparsely settled or populous locality, and the
character and volume of traffic that ordinarily

may be expected to pass over it, was proper.
Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 18, 171
P. 999 (1918).
In wrongful-death action against railroad
arising out of truck-train collision at crossing,
instruction that crossing must be maintained to
width equal to main-traveled portion of highway was substantially in accordance with this
section, and refusal to instruct jury that railroad had duty to maintain crossing for width of
sixteen feet was not error, especially where
width of crossing had no causal connection with
collision. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 112
Utah 189, 186 R2d 293 (1947), opinion
amended and rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218,
189 P.2d 701 (1948).
Failure to give requested instruction in
words of city ordinance on duty to plank or pave
crossing was not prejudicial error in wrongfuldeath action against railroad arising out of
truck-train collision at crossing, where instruction on maintenance of crossing was given in
words of this section, and was adequate to
permit jury to find for plaintiffs if jurors believed from evidence that deceased was stalled
because of improperly maintained crossing.
Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 112 Utah 189,
186 P.2d 293 (1947), opinion amended and
rehearing denied, 112 Utah 218, 189 P.2d 701
(1948).
—Questions of law a n d fact.
There being no statute specifically defining a
"good and sufficient" crossing, the question of
whether a certain crossing is good and sufficient is ordinarily one for jury to determine
from evidence adduced, unless it clearly appears that only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn from evidence respecting condition
of crossing, in which case it becomes question of
law for court. Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 52
Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (1918).
Pleading.
Complaint alleging that defendant railroad,
knowing that sheep were on its track, negligently and carelessly ran, managed, operated
and controlled a train so as to strike the sheep
stated a good cause of action. Smith v. San
Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 35 Utah 390, 100 P. 673
(1909).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads
§ 480etseq.
C.J.S. — 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 472.
AX.I3L — Indeflniteness of automobile speed
regulations as affecting validitv, 6 A.L.R.3d
1326.

Contributory negligence of child injured
while climbing over or through railroad train
blocking crossing, 11 A.L.R.3d 1168.
Governmental liability for failure to reduce
vegetation obscuring view at railroad crossing
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14.44.010

14.44.030

Grade crossings—Planking and
paving.
A. Every railway company operating within the
boundaries of the city shall keep every portion of
every city street or alley upon or across which their
tracks shall be or are constructed and maintained in
good and safe condition to accommodate public
travel. For this purpose, each railway company will
install and maintain the materials required in the
manner specified from time to time in writing by
the mayor to surface and maintain the same in good
condition for public travel.
B. The portions of the street or alley surfaces to
be so maintained by all such railway companies
shall include all the space between their different
rails and tracks and also the space outside the outer
rail of each outside track for a distance of two feet,
measured from the outside edge of the rail, for the
full width of the street or alley, including sidewalks,
or length of said street or alley, unless otherwise
directed by the mayor.
C. At all times, the surface of the street or alley
shall be maintained level with the top of the rails on
the track. After being directed in writing to surface
or perform maintenance work on an area of trackage, each such railway company shall complete the
work specified by the mayor within seven days on
small roadway repairs or thirty days for major capital improvements, or such other reasonable time as
specified by the city. Every railway company which
fails or refuses to comply with such notice, within
the time specified, shall pay to the city all costs and
expenses incurred by the city or others at its direction for performing the required surfacing and/or
maintenance work and the city may thereafter recover such costs and expenses, including attorneys fees
incidental thereto, in a civil action brought against
such railway company in any court having jurisdiction thereof. (Prior code § 35-1-5)
14.44.040

Viaducts and bridges—Required
when.
Such railroads shall, when required by the mayor,
construct suitable viaducts over all greets when life
or property may be endangered by rhe ordinary
ibull l.ukc C.is I-981
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FILED DISTRICT COOR^
T
hird Judicia: Oistric*
OCT - 9 2GC:
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
E. Scott Savage (2865)
Casey K. McGarvey (4882)
Chris R. Hogle (7223)
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200

SALT Jtf^E COUN <

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EDWARD GEORGE GOEBEL and
KATHY GOEBEL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
OMNI PRODUCTS, INC., UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
UTAH TRANSIT DISTRICT, SALT
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, and SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING
(1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RULING THAT PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC
NUISANCE CLAIMS ARE PER SE
LIABILITY CLAIMS AND NOT
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS, AND (2)
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE THIRD AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Civil No. 980912368PI
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

On September 10, 2001, this matter was before the Court on two of plaintiffs'
motions, plaintiffs' Motion for Ruling that Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Claims Are Per Se
Liability Claims and Not Negligence Claims, and plaintiffs' Motion to File Third Amended
Complaint. Plaintiffs were represented by Peter C. Collins. Defendant Salt Lake City

Southern Railroad Company was represented by Casey K. McGarvey and Chris R.
Hogle. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company was represented by Kent W.
Hansen. Defendant Utah Transit Authority was represented by Jesse C. Trentadue.
Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation was represented by Martha S. Stonebrook.
Having reviewed plaintiffs' motions, the pleadings and papers on file with the Court, and
authorities cited and submitted in connection with the motions and heard oral argument
and for good cause shown, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Ruling that Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Claims Are Per

Se Liability Claims and Not Negligence Claims is DENIED. Plaintiffs' public nuisance
claims, as alleged in plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, are not strict liability or per
se claims. Therefore, to prevail on their public nuisance claims, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the defendants' alleged conduct with respect to the purported public
nuisance was unreasonable, meaning intentional, negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous.
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint, in which

plaintiffs sought permission to add strict liability or per se public nuisance claims against
the defendants, is DENIED.
3.

In support of this Order, the Court, with one exception, adopts the points

and authorities set forth in Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company's Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Ruling that Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Claims Are
2

Per Se Liability Claims and Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company's Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint. The
Court does not adopt Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company's contention that if the
Court were to rule that plaintiffs' public nuisance claims were strict liability claims,
plaintiffs would be in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

In summary, the Court denies plaintiffs' motions on the following grounds:
a.

Under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs may

add a claim for relief only with written consent of the defendants or with leave of Court.
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint does not assert a strict liability or per se public
nuisance claim, and plaintiffs have neither defendants' consent nor leave of Court to
add one.
b.

Plaintiffs' proposed strict liability or per se public nuisance claims

are futile and legally insufficient. A strict liability or per se public nuisance claim is
available only if the alleged conduct giving rise to the nuisance is specifically prohibited
by statute. Plaintiffs have not identified a statute that specifically prohibits the
defendants' alleged conduct.
c.

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-11 and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-26 cannot

support strict liability or per se public nuisance claims. Neither of these statutes
specifically prohibits the defendants' alleged conduct.

3

d.

Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030 cannot support strict liability

or per se public nuisance claims. This ordinance does not specifically prohibit the
defendants' alleged conduct, and, in any event, a violation of an ordinance cannot
support a strict liability or per se public nuisance claim.
e.

Plaintiffs may not add strict liability or per se public nuisance claims

without pleading a statute which specifically prohibits the defendants' alleged conduct.
Without pleading such a statute, plaintiffs' proposed strict liability or per se public
nuisance claims would be too general and would contravene this Court's commitment to
reducing this case down to a non-moving target and putting some finality on what this
case is all about.
f.

Considering the discovery which has been conducted, the trial

setting and the serious nature of plaintiffs' proposed strict liability or per se public
nuisance claims, the defendants would be unfairly prejudiced if plaintiffs were granted
leave to add such claims.
g.

Plaintiffs did not submit the proposed third amended complaint they

seek leave to file. Plaintiffs provided only oblique references to the proposed

4

amendments they seek leave to file, and plaintiffs did not identify the substance of their
proposed amendments until they submitted the last memorandum on their motions.
DATED this ^

day of October, 2001.
BY JHE COURT;.:.

I
Hohbrat
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, LC. BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE

Ot.Ps&a
Peter C. Collins
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey
Chris R. Hogle
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., Inc.

SUITTER AXLAND

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
LAW DEPARTMENT

J£sse C. Trentadue
Kathleen Liuzzi
175 South West Temple, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Utah Transit Authority

IHansen
tOO West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Union Pacific Railroad Company
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SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

S. Stonebrbok
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
451 South State Street, #505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake City Corporation

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
ORDER DENYING (1) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RULING THAT PLAINTIFFS'
PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS ARE PER SE LIABILITY CLAIMS AND NOT
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS, AND (2) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this f ^
2001, to the following:
Peter C. Collins
Jacquelynn D. Carmichael
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, LC.
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Jesse C. Trentadue
Kathleen M. Liuzzi
SUITTER, AXLAND
175 South West Temple, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
J. Clare Williams
Kent W. Hansen
Union Pacific Railroad Company
Law Department
280 South 400 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Martha Stonebrook
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
451 South State Street, #505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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day of October,
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BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
E. Scott Savage (2865)
Casey K. McGarvey (4882)
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD GEORGE GOEBEL and
KATHY GOEBEL,

ORDER REGARDING SALT LAKE
CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, INC.'S DUTY TO
PLAINTIFFS AND GRANTING SALT
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, INC.'S MOTION FOR
DIRECTED VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
OMNI PRODUCTS, INC., UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
UTAH TRANSIT DISTRICT, SALT
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, and SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION, INC.,

Civil No. 980912368PI
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter was tried to a jury commencing on July 9, 2002. On July 17,
2002, plaintiffs closed their case in chief and rested. At that time, defendant Salt Lake City
Southern Railroad Company, Inc. ("Southern") moved for directed verdict and later that day
renewed its motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence after Southern rested its
case and the plaintiffs rested their rebuttal case. The motion for directed verdict was based upon

-1-

each of the grounds asserted in Southern's motion for summary judgment previously filed,
briefed, argued before, and denied by the Court. Southern was represented by E. Scott Savage
and Casey K. McGarvey, and plaintiffs were represented by Peter C. Collins.
The Honorable Tyrone Medley having seen and heard all of the evidence presented
during trial, having heard oral argument, and having considered the briefs and materials
submitted by the parties on the issues raised by Southern's motions for summary judgment and
directed verdict, hereby finds and concludes:
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-26, 10-7-9, 56-1-11 and Salt Lake City Ordinance

14.44.030 are applicable to Southern under the facts of this case, and Southern owed plaintiffs a
duty of reasonable care under those provisions and also by reason of its utilization of the
easement granted it by the Union Pacific Railroad Company.
2.

Southern owed plaintiffs no duty under principles recognized in the Restatement,

Second, of Torts §324A or under the "good Samaritan" doctrine.
3.

The agreements, including but not limited to the Administration and Coordination

Agreement of March 1993, between Southern and the Utah Transit Authority, are clear and
unambiguous and Southern owed plaintiffs no duty of care under any such agreement.
4.

No witness testified that he or she had observed the existence of a gap between

the seams of the rubber pads at the crossing at 1700 South which appeared to be hazardous or
potentially hazardous to bicyclists at any time prior to the date of the subject accident. Similarly,
there was no evidence of the existence of any maintenance record, report, inspection or other
documentation of the existence of such a gap prior to the date of the subject accident. To the
-2-

contrary, every witness who observed the crossing before the accident and/or who was in a
position to learn of any complaints about the surface of the subject crossing testified that they did
not observe such a gap or learn of any complaint or claim of the existence of such a gap at any
time prior to the date of the subject accident. Thus, viewing the evidence presented at trial in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs, there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in
this case because plaintiffs have established no competent evidence that a dangerous gap existed
between crossing surface pads for a period of time prior to Mr. Goebel's accident sufficient to
allow Southern to discover such a gap and remedy it. Without such evidence, Southern is
entitled to a grant of its motion for a directed verdict. In this regard, the evidence at most
establishes that gaps develop over time, but that evidence does not, in the Court's view, constitute
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to make a reasonable inference as to whether and, if so, how
long a dangerous gap existed prior to the occurrence of Mr. Goebel's accident.
5.

Although any "protuberance" immediately east of the easternmost part of the

crossing surface may very well have been a factor in Mr. Goebel's accident. Southern's alleged
failure to remedy the condition of some protuberance was not a proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's
accident. It is the particular alleged dangerous gap that was the proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's
accident. The fact that evidence may be in conflict as to the existence of a protuberance and the
duration of the existence of any protuberance is not significant, in this Court's view, because it is
the alleged gap which was the proximate cause of the accident and Mr. Goebel's injuries.

-3-

6.

Southern also is entitled to a grant of a directed verdict on plaintiffs' public

nuisance cause of action. The Court determines, on the facts of this case, that if there is no
negligence, there is no public nuisance.

7.

Southern is not entitled to directed verdict on any of the bases raised in Southern's

motion for summary judgment or motion for directed verdict other than those regarding notice of
and opportunity to remedy a dangerous condition.
The Court bases its ruling on the authority and analysis that is set forth in the portions of
Southern's memoranda in support of its motion for summary judgment which address the issue of
an absence of notice of a dangerous condition and opportunity to remedy, and for all the reasons
stated from the bench in open Court and on the record on July 18, 2002. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Southern's motion for directed verdict is GRANTED
and the plaintiffs' causes of action against Southern are dismissed with prejudice and upon the
merits.

1Q

/ /

DATED this< / day of L t/U^T

, 2002.
COURT:
•><o

able Tyrone E. Medle
Judicial District Coutt Judge
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Approvers to form:

Peter C.Collins
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.
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Tab 7

BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE
E. Scott Savage (2865)
Casey K. McGarvey (4882)
Attorneys for Defendant
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)328-2200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EDWARD GEORGE GOEBEL and
KATHY GOEBEL,

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL AS TO
SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, INC.

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 980912368PI
OMNI PRODUCTS, INC., UNION
PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
UTAH TRANSIT DISTRICT, SALT
LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY, and SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION, INC.,

Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on for jury trial beginning July 9, 2002. Plaintiffs,
Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel ("Goebels"), were represented by Peter C. Collins, and
defendant Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc ("Southern") was represented by E.
Scott Savage and Casey K. McGarvey. The Court having entered its Order Regarding Salt Lake

-1-

City Southern Railroad Company, Inc's Duty to Plaintiffs and Granting Salt Lake City Southern
Railroad Company, Inc's Motion For Directed Verdict, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is hereby
entered in favor of Southern and against the Goebels, no cause of action, and Southern is
awarded its costs in the amount of $

<lMi^Un^

fZuj^CcL

DATED this-

Judicial District Court Judgl^.

Approved as to form:

Peter C. Collins
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Tab 9

Exhibit D-4
With the pads numbered

Exhibit D-4
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